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We evaluate whether state-of-the-art macro models featuring indivisible labor are consistent with modern quasi-experimental micro evidence by synthesizing evidence on both the intensive and extensive margins. We find that micro estimates are consistent with macro estimates of the steady-state (Hicksian) elasticities relevant for cross-country comparisons on both the extensive and intensive margins. However, micro estimates of intertemporal substitution (Frisch) elasticities are an order of magnitude smaller than the values needed to explain business cycle fluctuations in aggregate hours by preferences. The key puzzle to be resolved is why micro and macro estimates of the Frisch extensive margin elasticity are so different.

Macroeconomic calibrations imply much larger labor supply elasticities than microeconometric studies. One prominent explanation for this divergence is that indivisible labor generates extensive margin responses that are not captured in micro studies of hours choices. We evaluate whether existing calibrations of macro models are consistent with micro evidence on extensive margin responses using two approaches. First, we use a standard calibrated macro model to simulate the impacts of tax policy changes on labor supply. Second, we present a metaanalysis of quasi-experimental estimates of extensive margin elasticities. We …nd that micro estimates are consistent with macro evidence on the steady-state (Hicksian) elasticities relevant for cross-country comparisons. However, micro estimates of extensive-margin elasticities are an order of magnitude smaller than the values needed to explain business cycle ‡uctuations in aggregate hours. Hence, indivisible labor supply does not explain the large gap between micro and macro estimates of intertemporal substitution (Frisch) elasticities. Our synthesis of the micro evidence points to Hicksian elasticities of 0.3 on the intensive and 0.25 on the extensive margin and Frisch elasticities of 0.5 on the intensive and 0.25 on the extensive margin.Emails: chetty@fas.harvard.edu, guren@fas.harvard.edu, dsmanoli@econ.ucla.edu, a.weber@uni-mannheim.de. We would like to thank Daron Acemoglu, Orazio Attanasio, Mark Bils, Richard Blundell, Gregory Bruich, David Card, John Friedman, Bob Hall, Greg Mankiw, Jonathan Parker, Luigi Pistaferri, Richard Rogerson, Robert Shimer, Michael Woodford, Danny Yagan, Susan Yang, and the conference participants for helpful comments. We are extremely grateful to Peter Ganong and Jessica Laird for outstanding research assistance. Thanks to Richard Rogerson and Johanna Wallenius for sharing their simulation code.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Nonparametric Evidence on the Effects of Financial Incentives on Retirement Decisions Abstract This paper presents new evidence on the effects of retirement benefits on labor force participation decisions. The analysis is based on a mandated rule for employer-provided retirement benefits in Austria that creates discontinuities in the incentives for workers to delay retirement. We present graphical evidence on labor supply responses and effective financial incentives and develop nonparametric methods to estimate extensive margin labor supply elasticities. Overall, multiple results highlight modest impacts of financial incentives on retirement decisions. JEL-Code: H310, J140, J260. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

There is increasing evidence that tax benefits for college do not affect college enrollment. This may be because prospective students do not know about tax benefits for college or because the design of tax benefits is not conducive to affecting educational outcomes. We focus on changing awareness of tax benefits by providing information to students or prospective students. We sent e‐mails and letters to students that described tax benefits for college, and we tracked college outcomes. For all three of our samples—rising high school seniors, already enrolled students, and students who had previously applied to college but were not currently enrolled—information about tax benefits for college did not affect enrollment or reenrollment. We test whether effects vary according to information frames and found that no treatment arms changed student outcomes. We conclude that awareness is not the primary reason that tax benefits for college do not affect enrollment.