We take it that we can exercise doxastic agency by reasoning and by making judgments. We take it, that is, that we can actively make up our minds by reasoning and judging. On what I call the 'Standard View' this is so because judgment can yield belief. It is typical to take it that judgments yield beliefs by causing them. But on the resultant understanding of the Standard View, I argue, it is unclear how judgment could play its role in doxastic agency in the way we take it to. I therefore offer an alternative understanding of how judgment yields belief. Drawing on Ryle (2009) I argue that when one comes to believe by judging the event which is one's judging is token identical to the event which is one's coming to believe. This paves the way for version of the Standard View capable of explaining how we can actively make up our minds despite that we cannot believe or come to believe at will.

We naturally see ourselves as capable of being active with respect to the matter of what we believeas capable of epistemic agency. A natural view is that we can exercise such agency by engaging in reasoning. Sceptics contend that such a view cannot be maintained in light of the fact that reasoning involves judgements, which are not decided upon or the products of prior intentions. In response, I argue that reasoning in fact can amount to epistemic agency in virtue of its being aim-directed in a way that cannot be reconciled with the sceptics' conception of it.

Williamson's (Knowledge and its limits, Oxford

Recent philosophical work on the relation between reasoning and bodily action is dominated by two views. It is orthodox to have it that bodily actions can be at most causally involved in reasoning. Others have it that reasoning can constitutively involve bodily actions, where this is understood as a matter of non-mental bodily events featuring as constituents of practical reasoning. Reflection on cases of reasoning out-loud suggests a neglected alternative on which both practical and theoretical reasoning can have bodily actions as constituents, where such bodily actions themselves amount to contentful mental events. Furthermore, the natural lines of resistance to this view trade on type-token errors, or on a questionable common-factor assumption. KEYWORDS action, disjunctivism, Gilbert Ryle, practical reasoning, reasoning, thinking out-loud Causalism and AristotelianismReasoning is a distinctive kind of aim-directed process with constituent events. In particular, reasoning is a kind of aim-directed thinking (McHugh & Way, 2018). Suppose that one is reasoning about whether p, for instance. To do so is to engage in thinking in order to work out/figure out/determine whether p. If one works out/figures out/determines whether p by engaging in such reasoning then one has achieved one's aim, otherwise not. Such reasoning will have constituent events such as judgments, inferences and acts of supposition. One might reason about whether p by first supposing that p, then by inferring q, for instance, such that the latter events qualify as constituents of the aim-directed process which is one's reasoning.Everyone should agree that our bodily actions can affect the course of our reasoning. It is a familiar fact that taking a stroll can affect what occurs to you as you work through a problem, for example. Everyone should likewise agree that there is a sense in which reasoning can issue in bodily action. Reasoning about what to do might bring to light what the best course of action is, for instance, and lead to one's acting accordingly. But can the relation between reasoning and bodily action be more intimate than it is revealed to be by