Luminosity in the stream of consciousness

Abstract

Williamson's (Knowledge and its limits, Oxford

Blocking Kripke’s Argument Against the Type-Identity Theory of Mind

“…So, if we accept Williamson's argument, we may conclude with Srinivasan that "the common picture of the phenomenal realm as one of privileged access turns out to be a Cartesian orthodoxy from which philosophy must be cleansed" (Srinivasan, 2015: 294). Surely, we may restrict Williamson's argument to states and prevent it from being applied to events and processes (see Jenkins, 2021) but, for that matters the debate on pain in the philosophy of mind, states are enough. And here the fact is that Louise may have her C-fiber firing and not feeling pain, but such a condition is tantamount to that of the unnoticeable difference in the case of the comparison with Thelma's sensitivity to pain.…”

The Limited Phenomenal Infallibility thesis

“…46 It is worth mentioning that the distinction between states and events can do more theoretical work than merely show that there are no occurrent beliefs. For instance, Jenkins (2018) has convincingly argued that Williamson's (2000) anti-luminosity argument is limited in scope because it fails to demonstrate that events cannot be luminous. 47 Recall that whether LPI turns out to be false or vacuously true depends on which formulation of the view is being considered.…”

Some Problems with the Anti‐Luminosity‐Argument

“…One prominent such strategy is to invoke the Chalmers (2003) notion of ‘direct phenomenal concepts’ (Barz 2017) (Duncan 2018). Jenkins (2018) accepts the ALA but argues that luminosity still obtains for certain mental processes and events (rather than mental conditions).…”