No abstract

No abstract

No abstract

No abstract

This p^)er r^»rts on the results of an auction sale of 83 aondcminium apartment units in New Jersey. At the auctiOTi every unit was hammered dcvm, but, unknown to the 2,348 registered bidders, 40% of the sales fell throuc^. Prices in the subsequent sale of oondaninium 'onits in face to face negotiatioTS resulted in identical units selling for 13% less than they fetched at auction and the discount was largest for those units haininered dcwn early in the auction. These results are inccaTsistent with the usual predictions from the theory of cannon value aucticxis and suggest that uninformed bidders in this auction may have been the subject of a "winner's curse" v*iich generated considerable profit for the seller.The authors are eiffiliated with Princetai Iftiiversity and the Natiaial Bureau of Econcndc Research (Ashenfelter) and MIT (Genesove) . This p^jer is a preliminary r^»rt of the results of a larger study of condcDdnium real estate aucticxis and was prepared for presentaticsi at the

No abstract

No abstract

No abstract