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This research was supported, in part, by SRI International. We are grateful to Terry Johnson and Richard West for helpful discussions. The research reported here is part of the NBIER's research program in Labor Studies and project in Government Budget. Any opinions expressed are those of the authors and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

At the first wine auction I ever attended, I saw the repeal of the law of one price. This empirical surprise led me to begin collecting data on wine auctions, to interview auctioneers, and even to buy a little wine. In the meantime I have also had the opportunity (with John Abowd) to observe and collect data on the auction sale of impressionist and contemporary paintings. This paper reports on some of the empirical regularities that I and others have observed in the actual operation of the auction markets for these items. In view of the rich and diverse array of theoretical literature on auctions, it seems high time economists began to spell out precisely what facts it is meant to explain.