This paper argues that attempts to buy insurgency out of violence can achieve temporary stability but risk to produce new conflict. While co-optation with economic incentives might work in parts of a movement, it can spark ripple effects in others. These unanticipated developments result from the interactions of differently situated elite and non-elite actors, which can create a momentum of their own in driving collective behaviour. This paper develops this argument by analysing the reescalation of armed conflict between the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) and Myanmar's armed forces after a 17-year-long ceasefire broke down in 2011. After years of mutual enrichment and collaboration between rebel and state elites and near organisational collapse, the insurgency's new-found resolve and capacity is particularly puzzling. Based on extensive field research, this article explains why and how the state's attempt to co-opt rebel leaders with economic incentives resulted in group fragmentation, loss of leadership legitimacy, increased factional contestation, growing resentments among local communities and the movement's rank and file, and ultimately the rebuilding of popular resistance from within.

Article (Accepted Version) http://sro.sussex.ac.uk Brenner, David (2018) Inside the Karen insurgency: explaining conflict and conciliation in Myanmar's changing borderlands. Asian Security, 14 (2). pp. 83-99.

The presence of tumor thrombus secondary to inferior vena caval extension from renal carcinoma carries the threat of pulmonary tumor embolus. In theory, safe prophylaxis could be accomplished by placement of a Greenfield filter in the suprarenal vena cava, which has been accomplished without complication. We treated 6 patients with renal call carcinoma and extensive tumor thrombus of the vena cava with suprarenal filter placement as an adjunct to thrombectomy and nephrectomy. Clinically all 6 patients have done well. However, the over-all rate of vena caval thrombosis or occlusion associated with infrarenal filter placement is 3 to 5%. To investigate the potential risk to renal function if a vena caval occlusion occurred above a solitary kidney shortly after unilateral nephrectomy, we performed suprarenal inferior vena caval ligations after unilateral nephrectomy in 10 dogs. A total of 6 dogs suffered persistent loss of renal function and 3 of these 6 died of uremia. Of 4 dogs who underwent suprarenal inferior vena caval ligation only 1 (25%) had persistent compromise of renal function. A total of 2 dogs underwent unilateral nephrectomy only without compromise of normal renal function. We conclude that the risk of total vena caval occlusion after suprarenal Greenfield filter placement is small. However, should it occur in the setting of recent nephrectomy there is potential for significant renal morbidity. In selected patients this risk may be offset by the potential benefits that the filter offers in terms of protection against tumor and/or bland pulmonary embolus. Further clinical experience will be needed to strengthen and clarify the indications and benefits of preoperative or intraoperative filter placement as reported.

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This article historicises the nature of political transition in Myanmar to better appreciate the challenges faced by civil society. After Myanmar's political reforms in 2011, Western donors rushed into the country in support of what they misunderstood as a remarkable instance of democratisation. In 2019, escalating civil war, ethnic cleansing, and contracting civil liberties urge a rethink. This article argues that viewing transition in Myanmar through the lens of democratisation has always been misleading and problematic. Partial liberalisation was orchestrated by the military to safeguard its own power. Reforms have not only benefited civil society but also enabled the growth of uncivil society, fuelling sectarian violence and bolstering military rule. Operating on the assumption of democratisation, Western donors shifted funds from grassroots networks to militarised state bureaucracies that seek to co-opt peace-building and development projects for the purposes of ethnocratic state-building and counterinsurgency. Rethinking the nature of transition is pivotal for preventing inadvertently aiding authoritarianism and conflict.

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