a b s t r a c tScholars in the social sciences use network theory to study a range of collective action problems. Often the goal is to identify how the structure of the network affects efforts to coordinate or cooperate, and research suggests that adding connections to a network can improve the performance of groups faced with such tasks. On the other hand, theory and empirics also suggest that additional connections can degrade the performance of a network. If connections can have negative effects then it is important to consider if there are alternatives to adding connections to a network that can also improve network performance. Because a primary function of connections in a network is to disseminate information, providing individuals with more information about the network may act as a substitute for adding connections to a network. We test experimentally whether providing subjects with more information about the structure of networks can improve coordination. We find that a more complete view of the network leads to faster coordination, but the magnitude of this effect depends on network structure. These results suggest that changing what actors know about a network can improve outcomes without having to add connections that may impede overall performance.
Reciprocity is central to our understanding of politics. Most political exchanges-whether they involve legislative vote trading, interbranch bargaining, constituent service, or even the corrupt exchange of public resources for private wealth-require reciprocity. But how does reciprocity arise? Do government officials learn reciprocity while holding office, or do recruitment and selection practices favor those who already adhere to a norm of reciprocity? We recruit Zambian politicians who narrowly won or lost a previous election to play behavioral games that provide a measure of reciprocity. This combination of regression discontinuity and experimental designs allows us to estimate the effect of holding office on behavior. We find that holding office increases adherence to the norm of reciprocity. This study identifies causal effects of holding office on politicians' behavior.regression discontinuity | behavioral games | reciprocity | legislative bargaining | corruption
Reciprocity is central to our understanding of politics. Most political exchanges-whether they involve legislative vote trading, interbranch bargaining, constituent service, or even the corrupt exchange of public resources for private wealth-require reciprocity. But how does reciprocity arise? Do government officials learn reciprocity while holding office, or do recruitment and selection practices favor those who already adhere to a norm of reciprocity? We recruit Zambian politicians who narrowly won or lost a previous election to play behavioral games that provide a measure of reciprocity. This combination of regression discontinuity and experimental designs allows us to estimate the effect of holding office on behavior. We find that holding office increases adherence to the norm of reciprocity. This study identifies causal effects of holding office on politicians' behavior.regression discontinuity | behavioral games | reciprocity | legislative bargaining | corruption
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