Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your personal and scholarly purposes.You are not to copy documents for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. licence. www.econstor.eu IZA DP No. 122 If the documents have been made available under an Open Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated Returns to Human Capital under the Communist Wage Grid and During the Transition to a Market EconomyDaniel Munich Jan Svejnar Katherine Terrell Under communism, workers had their wages set according to a centrally-determined wage grid. In this paper we use new micro data on men to estimate returns to human capital under the communist wage grid and during the transition to a market economy. We use data from the Czech Republic because it is a leading transition economy in which the communist grid remained intact until the very end of the communist regime. We demonstrate that for decades the communist wage grid maintained extremely low rate of return on education, but that the return increased dramatically and equally in all ownership categories of firms during the transition. Our estimates also indicate that men's wage-experience profile was concave in both regimes and on average it did not change from the communist to the transition period. However, the de novo private firms display a more concave profile than SOEs and public administration. Contrary to earlier studies, we show that men's inter-industry wage structure changed substantially between 1989 and 1996. D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E S 1 1RQWHFKQLFDO 6XPPDU\During a significant part of the twentieth century, over one-third of the world's population lived under the communist system. A large proportion of those who were in the labor force had their wages set according to a centrally-determined wage grid. While the effects of the grid have never been formally analyzed, there has been a general perception that earnings structures in centrally planned economies were very compressed and that one should observe decompression as well as major changes in the wage structure with privatization of state owned enterprises (SOEs) and the emergence of GH QRYR private firms during the transition to a market system. In this paper we use new micro data to (a) analyze returns to h...

Do women perform worse than equally able men in stressful competitive settings? We ask this question for competitions with a high payoff--admissions to tuition-free selective universities. With data on an entire cohort of Czech students graduating from secondary schools and applying to universities, we show that, compared to men of similar general skills and subject-of-study preferences, women perform similarly well when competition is less intense, but perform substantially worse (are less likely to be admitted) when applying to very selective universities.

Münich, Daniel, Svejnar, Jan, and Terrell, Katherine-Is women's human capital valued more by markets than by planners?Using micro data on women in the Czech Republic, we compare returns to various measures of human capital at three points in time, namely, the end of Communism (1989), in mid-transition (1996), and in late-transition (2002). We find dramatic increases in returns to education from 1989 to 1996 but no change from 1996 to 2002 and no differences in returns to education in state vs. privately-owned firms. We demonstrate that sheepskin or diploma effects exist in both regimes and rise over time; moreover, they are similar across firm ownership types. We find no difference between the returns to education obtained during Communism and the returns to schooling obtained during the transition. Wage-experience profiles do not change over time. The pattern and rates of increase in the returns to education over these three points in time are similar for women and men. In sum, markets pay women and men equally more for their human capital than did the planners; all of the adjustment occurred early in the transition and it was driven by market forces rather than private ownership.

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