Why do constituent parties that participated in a party merger that was intended to be permanent decide to leave the merger to re‐enter party competition separately? To address this question, merger termination is conceptualised in this article as an instance of new party formation, coalition termination and institutionalisation failure. Building on this conceptualisation, three sets of factors are presented that account for which mergers are likely to be terminated by constituent parties and which are not. To test these three sets of hypotheses, a mixed‐methods design is used. First, survival analysis is applied to a new dataset on the performance of mergers in 21 European democracies during the postwar period. The findings support hypotheses derived from a conception of merger termination as new party formation: pre‐ and post‐merger legislative performance significantly affect the probability of merger termination. Furthermore, the institutionalisation of constituent parties helps to sustain mergers if the latter already built trust in pre‐merger cooperation, in line with the conception of merger termination as institutionalisation failure. Two theory‐confirming case studies are then analysed: one case of merger survival and the other of termination. These case studies substantiate the working of the significant variables identified in the large‐N analysis that drove the selection of case studies. They also reveal how mediating factors difficult to capture in large‐N designs help to account for why factors that – theoretically – should have complicated the working of the ‘survival case’, and should have been beneficial to the ‘termination case’, did not generate the expected effects.

Ideology is one of the most relevant variables in explaining the level of women’s representation attained by political parties. While left-wing parties are typically the best performers, extant research has tended to overlook the diversity of the left block and predominantly focused on mainstream left-wing political parties, namely the Social Democrats. Yet, the Left also includes both Green parties and radical left parties. This article analyzes the differences that exist within this largely heterogeneous group of parties across Western Europe. In particular, it explores how the diverse ideological background of radical left and Green parties leads to varied ways of engaging with feminism, diverse forms of organizing women within their ranks as well as dissimilar positions toward gender quotas. These shape different levels of women’s numerical representation in public office and in party decision-making positions. Generally, we find that ideology is a greater determinant of representation than geographical region. Our findings also show a significant convergence among distinct party subgroups in terms of their share of elected women in both party and public office.

This article examines how the British public perceived UK Prime Minister David Cameron's plan to renegotiate his country's relationship with the EU. It asks whether attitudes towards renegotiation followed a similar pattern to attitudes towards Brexit. It asks: are preferences towards renegotiation and Brexit related, and did British citizens perceive them as conflicting or complementary? We modelled the similarities and differences between these two types of preferences, which allowed us to classify the attitudes into four patterns: unconditional europhiles, rejectionist eurosceptics, risk‐averse eurosceptics and power‐seeking eurosceptics. Using a large‐N cross‐sectional survey conducted in the UK in April 2015 (n = 3000), our findings suggest that similar utilitarian concerns underpinned both types of preferences; but education and partisan cues differentiated them. Our findings have implications for understanding the result of the UK referendum. They also highlight the complex considerations that drive citizens’ attitudes towards the EU and help us predict the scope of public acceptance of EU reform initiatives by other governments.

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The Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats are often portrayed as BritainÕs proEuropean parties. Indeed, both parties express a keen interest in keeping Britain in the European Union (EU) and in promoting a constructive engagement with other member states. Yet, to what extent can the two parties be characterized as Europhiles? In this article, we develop Taggart and SzczerbiakÕs (2008) concept of hard and soft Euroscepticism, extend it to Europhile party positions, and apply it to Labour and the Liberal DemocratsÕ recent European policies. For this purpose, we analyze manifestos and party leadersÕ key speeches on the EU. We find, overall, that the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats are ÔsoftÕ Europhiles whose discourses have focused on EU reform. Yet, whilst their EU policies are very similar, their EU strategies differ: the Labour leadership have generally tried to contain the salience of EU issues, whereas the Liberal Democrats have followed a more offensive EU strategy after 2014. This can best be explained through electoral incentives and internal dynamics.