The present research, involving three experiments, examined the existence of implicit attitudes of Whites toward Blacks, investigated the relationship between explicit measures of racial prejudice and implicit measures of racial attitudes, and explored the relationship of explicit and implicit attitudes to race-related responses and behavior. Experiment 1, which used a priming technique, demonstrated implicit negative racial attitudes (i.e., The research reported in this article was supported by NIMH Grant MH 48721. We are grateful for the helpful comments and suggestions offered by Mahzarin Banaji, Clark McCauley, and two anonymous reviewers.

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This article reports the results of a meta‐analytic integration of previous research on illusory correlation in stereotyping effects. The following patterns were observed. The basic distinctiveness‐based illusory correlation effect is highly significant, and of moderate strength. Consistent with theoretical expectations, distinctiveness‐based illusory correlation effects are stronger when the distinctive behaviour is negative. Effects are also stronger as a function of the number of exemplars presented in the stimulus array. This is consistent with the effects of memory load on covariation judgement demonstrated elsewhere. Finally, subjects' judgements of covariation in the distinctiveness‐based illusory correlation paradigm are significantly predicted by the paired distinctive covariation judgement strategy. This indicates that subjects' judgements of covariation in the illusory correlation in stereotyping paradigm seem to reflect a responsiveness to the information being presented to them, and especially a reliance upon distinctive information. Discussion considers possible mechanisms for these effects, and suggests that future research examine the processes underlying the effects of the valence of the distinctive behaviours, the effects of the number of exemplars, and the strategies followed in making these types of covariation judgements.

It would not be a great exaggeration to say that scholars of environmental conservation and conflict have re-discovered the institutional foundations of social and economic life. At the heart of this 'renaissance' is the belief that property and property relations have a strong bearing on how people use, manage and abuse natural resource systems, and that institutional arrangements based on the creation and management of common property can have positive impacts on resource use and conservation. Two bodies of thought compete for a voice in this literature. One, which aims to resolve Hardin's tragedy of the commons, is primarily concerned with the problem of encouraging collective action to conserve resources that are both depletable and unregulated. A second, influenced by notions of moral economy and entitlement, deals with the problem of creating and sustaining resource access for poor and vulnerable groups in society. This article argues that the literature on common property has become divided between a body of scholarship that uses deductive models of individual decision-making and rational choice to explain the ways in which different types of property rights arrangements emerge and change over time, and one whose questions, aims and methods are more modest, and historically-specific. It then aims to understand this evolution by situating the mainstream common property discourse in the wider intellectual trend of positivism, methodological individualism and formal modelling that has come to dominate social science in the United States. In so doing, it attempts to unravel the political and ideological foundations of what has come to be a dominant mode of understanding environmental problems, and solutions to these problems.

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Two experiments were designed to explore whether encoding information in reference to a group would facilitate the later recall of that information to the same extent as encoding with reference to the self. In both experiments, participants encoded adjectives with reference to the self, semantic properties, or a group and were subsequently given a surprise-free recall test. In Experiment 1 (N ¼ 37), the participants' university served as the reference group. In Experiment 2 (N ¼ 41), the participants' family served as the reference group. In both experiments, self-reference resulted in better recall than semantic processing, replicating the typical self-reference effect (SRE). More importantly, strong evidence for a group-reference effect (GRE) was found in that group-reference resulted in better recall than semantic processing and in fact facilitated recall to the same extent as self-referencing. The existing explanations (schemas, organization, elaboration, mental cueing, and evaluation) for the SRE were compared with regard to their viability in accounting for the GRE patterns. We discuss additional features that may be important in the explanation of the SRE and suggest future directions for research on group-referencing.