The refugee regime structure follows a "xeno-racist" colonial genealogy. In this context, refugee cash transfers represent a biopolitical diagnostic, indicating where refugees are worthy or have the "bio-legitimacy" to reside. This article offers a brief genealogy of different iterations of cash operations, which include cash for repatriation at the end of the Cold War, cash for urban Iraqi refugees in Jordan following the second Gulf War, and the Tanzania government's recent decision to abruptly shut down a cash project in Nyarugusu refugee camp. Simply stated, where cash is allowed to flow, so too are refugees. RésuméLa structure du régime des réfugiés suit une généalogie coloniale « xéno-raciste ». Dans ce contexte, les transferts d' argent aux réfugiés représentent un diagnostic biopolitique indiquant où les réfugiés sont dignes ou ont la «biolégitimité» de résider. Cet article propose une brève généalogie des différentes itérations des opérations de transfert d' argent, dont le rapatriement d' argent à la fin de la Guerre froide; l' aide en espèces pour les réfugiés urbains irakiens en Jordanie suite à la seconde Guerre du Golfe ; et la décision récente du gouvernement tanzanien de brusquement mettre fin à un programme de transfert d' argent dans le camp de réfugiés de Nyarugusu. En bref, là où l' argent est autorisé à circuler, les réfugiés le sont également.

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It is a poorly kept humanitarian secret that wherever food aid is given, it is also sold, as recipients seek to vary their diets to include culturally desired food, start businesses, or deal with economic shocks. This holds true in Nyarugusu refugee camp in Tanzania, the site of this research. While this article addresses the supply side of the World Food Programme resale system, its main focus is the demand side, providing one of the first in-depth studies on what happens after the sale. Engaging with the political and development anthropology literature on brokers, the author introduces the intermediaries who make up this system, including low-level madalali brokers and refugee and Tanzanian 'bosses'. There is agreement within brokerage research of the moral 'ambiguity' or 'ambivalence' of these figures, a nebulous quality that is heightened by the seemingly innumerable different types of brokers. This article contends that a Marxian conceptualization of social class, beyond Bourdieu's widely applied social capital theory, is productive in understanding the threat of violence that a small cartel of bosses has set up in collusion with Tanzanian police to maintain the exploitative food aid resale pyramid. Members of this elite class are, in turn, 'products and producers' of a structurally violent encampment and aid system.

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