The theory of boundary organizations was developed to address an important group of institutions in American society neglected by scholarship in science studies and political science. The long-term stability of scientific and political institutions in the United States has enabled a new class of institutions to grow and thrive as mediators between the two. As originally developed, this structural feature of these new institutions-that is, their location on the boundary between science and politics-dominated theoretical frameworks for explaining their behavior. Applying the theory of boundary organizations to international society requires a refocusing of some of the theory's central features, however. In this article, I introduce a new framework-hybrid management-to explain the activities of boundary organizations inthe more complex, contingent, and contested settings of global politics. I develop the framework of hybrid management using the specific example of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change's Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice.

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Co-production has become a cornerstone of research within the sustainability sciences, motivating collaborations of diverse actors to conduct research in the service of societal and policy change. This review examines theoretical and empirical literature from sustainability science, public administration, and science and technology studies (STS) with the intention of advancing the theory and practice of co-production within sustainability science. We argue that co-production must go beyond stakeholder engagement by scientists to the more deliberate design of societal transitions. Co-production can contribute to such transitions by shifting the institutional arrangements that govern relationships between knowledge and power, science and society, and state and citizens. We highlight critical weaknesses in conceptualizations of co-production within sustainability sciences with respect to power, politics, and governance. We offer suggestions for how this can be rectified through deeper engagement with public administration and STS to offer a broad vision for enhancing the use, design, and practice of a more reflexive co-production in sustainability science.

The role and design of global expert organizations such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) or the Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) needs rethinking. Acknowledging that a one-size-fits-all model does not exist, we suggest a reflexive turn that implies treating the governance of expertise as a matter of political contestation.

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Abstract. The study of atmospheric tides has long recognized the importance of electrodynamic or ohmic losses, in the form of J x B forces, on the strength of winds in the Earth's upper atmosphere. Now, recent observations of ionospheric and atmospheric phenomena (particularly, but not exclusively, at midlatitudes) are suggesting that electrodynamic processes may also be important for atmospheric buoyancy waves with periods as short as a few hours. During the daytime, passive ohmic losses may be responsible for a strong azimuthal filtering of buoyancy waves which limits their propagation in the upper atmosphere to near equatorward where there is a minimum of the J x B drag. At night, the active development of plasma instabilities, whose growth rate is also strongly azimuthally dependent, may not only minimize ion drag but may also feed energy into particular buoyancy waves to counteract the nighttime's enhanced molecular and thermal dissipation, thus creating a strong equatorward and westward orientation to observed traveling ionospheric disturbances. In all, the strength of the apparent coupling between buoyancy waves and ionospheric electrodynamics in the upper atmosphere may suggest the classification and study of a new form of electrohydrodynamic waves.

The central problem of democracy has long been theorized as how to place appropriate constraints on the responsible exercise of power. Today, this problem is most acute in global governance. This article examines the rapid rise in the creation of international knowledge institutions, arguing that these institutions reflect a growing effort by nations and publics to assert democratic constraints on the on the global exercise of power through their ability to structure processes of reasoning and deliberation in global society. Specifically, the article argues for the need to attend carefully to processes of knowledge-making in international institutions, including the roles of international institutions in setting standards for the exercise of reasoning, their contributions to the making of global kinds through their work in classifying and reclassifying the objects of international discourse, and through their roles in opening up and constraining participation in international deliberation. The article concludes that the construction and deployment of policy-relevant knowledge are a significant source of power in their own right in global governance that need to be subject to their own democratic critique.Theories of deliberative democracy suggest that the central problem in the constitution of democratic order is "how to preserve liberty by inventing checks on the wielders of power, apportioning and monitoring it, ensuring its responsible exercise" (Keane 1998, xxii). For much of modern history, democratic publics have struggled to place limits on the legitimate exercise of power within the context of the nation state. In recent decades, however, processes of globalization have blurred the lines between national and international governance, at once calling into question classical solutions to the dilemmas of power in democratic societies and highlighting the absence of democratic constraints on the abuse of power in world affairs (Miller 2005). As Robert Keohane has observed, "Institutional protection from the arbitrary exercise of coercion, or authoritative exploitation, will be as important at the global level as at the level of the national state" (Keohane 2002, 326). Yet, to date, the prospects for constituting democratic order in global politics-for legitimating and holding