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SUMMARY Conditions leading up to and surrounding the global financial crisis prompted an increasing number of firms to create board-level risk oversight committees (RCs). The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (U.S. House of Representatives 2010) even legislates RCs for certain large banks. Distinct from audit committees, RCs present a unique setting to extend our understanding of the relation between emerging governance mechanisms and auditing. Using a sample of 3,980 U.S.-listed banks from 2003–2011, we find that on average, the presence of RCs is associated with higher audit fees. Our results are robust to multiple specifications, including self-selection and propensity score matched samples. For a reduced sample of 458 firms that employ an RC we also examine RC characteristics. We find RC independence and audit committee overlaps are associated with lower audit fees and RC size, relative to board size, is associated with higher audit fees. Supplemental analysis provides discussion of the potential audit environment implications of mandatory versus voluntary risk management controls. Data Availability: The data used are publicly available from the sources cited in the text.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine whether earnings quality attributes are reflected in AM best's financial strength ratings (FSRs), a measure widely used in the insurance industry to assess financial health. Design/methodology/approach – Using a sample of insurance companies during the period 2006-2012, the authors measure the quality of reported earnings using three accounting-based measures: earnings persistence, accrual quality, and earnings smoothness. Findings – The authors find that better earnings persistence, higher accrual quality, and less earnings smoothing are reflected in higher FSRs for both public and private insurers, with the magnitude of the effect greater for private insurers. Originality/value – This is the first study of which the authors are aware that seeks to understand the impact, if any, of variations in the quality of reported financial information on the perceived financial health of firms by ratings agencies in the insurance industry. The authors also include a novel research design in assessing the determinants of financial health ratings. Users of FSRs should be aware of the impact of ownership structure on ratings agencies’ propensity to incorporate reported earnings attributes in their ratings.