I commit myself to the ‘common‐sense restraint’ that testimony is in fact an important source of knowledge. This has the consequence of making the dispute between reductionists and anti‐reductionists a question of the possibility of reducing the epistemic status of testimony to that of other epistemic resources such as perception, memory and inference. I accept arguments (from Coady and Stevenson) against the possibility of global reductionism, but little importance can be attached to their victory if the local reductionist threat (from Fricker) is not met. The strength of the local reductionist case rests on the plausibility of a distinction between developmental and mature epistemic phases, and on a reductionist stipulation of default settings. I claim that the distinction is either irrelevant or detrimental to the local case, and that default settings are more perspicuously thought of as due to the irreducible reliability of testimony.
Kant is clear that the concept of the ‘highest good’ involves both a demand, that we follow the moral law, as well as a promise, that happiness will be the outcome of being moral. The latter element of the highest good has troubled commentators, who tend to find it metaphysically extravagant, involving, as it does, belief in God and an afterlife. Furthermore, it seems to threaten the moral purity that Kant demands: that we obey the moral law for its own sake, not out of interest in the consequences. Those commentators brave enough to tackle the issue look to the concept of the highest good either to add content to the moral law (Silber), or to provide rational motivation, in a way that does not violate moral purity (Beiser and Wood). I argue that such interpretations, although they may be plausible reconstructions, are unable to account for certain conceptual and textual problems. By placing Kant's thought against the background of medieval theology, I argue that the hope for the summum bonum is irreducibly important for Kant, even where its function is not that of providing the content or motivational force of the moral law. Kant is not only concerned with the shape of our duties and motivations, but the shape of the universe within which these emerge.
I demonstrate that the pre-Critical Kant is essentialist and intellectualist about the relational properties of substances. That is to say, God can choose whether or not to create a substance, and whether or not to connect this substance with other substances, so as to create a world: but God cannot choose what the nature of the relational properties is, once the substance is created and connected. The divine will is constrained by the essences of substances. Nonetheless, Kant considers that essences depend upon God, in that they depend upon the divine intellect. I conclude by gesturing towards some possible implications of this interpretation, when considering the role that might be played by God – both historically and conceptually – in relation to the notion of ‘laws of nature’, and when understanding Kant's transcendental idealism and his Critical conception of freedom.
The book offers a definitive study of the development of Kant’s conception of the highest good, from his earliest work, to his dying days. It is argued that Kant believes in God, but that he is not a Christian, and that this opens up an important and neglected dimension of Western philosophy. Kant is not a Christian, because he cannot accept Christianity’s traditional claims about the relationship between divine action, grace, human freedom, and happiness. Christian theologians who continue to affirm these traditional claims (and many do), therefore have grounds to be suspicious of Kant as an interpreter of Christian doctrine. As well as setting out a theological critique of Kant, the book offers a new defence of the power, beauty, and internal coherence of Kant’s non-Christian philosophical religiosity, ‘within the limits of reason alone’, which reason itself has some divine features. This neglected strand of philosophical religiosity deserves to be engaged with by both philosophers, and theologians. The Kant revealed in this book reminds us of a perennial task of philosophy, going back to Plato, where philosophy is construed as a way of life, oriented towards happiness, and achieved through a properly expansive conception of reason and happiness. When we understand this philosophical religiosity, many standard ‘problems’ in the interpretation of Kant can be seen in a new light, and resolved. Kant witnesses to a strand of philosophy that leans into the category of the divine, at the edges of what we can say about reason, freedom, autonomy, and happiness.
This chapter traces Kant’s shift from an incompatibilist to a compatibilist conception of human freedom: in the 1750s Kant considers that human freedom does not require the agent to be able to do otherwise, nor does Kant require the agent to be ultimately responsible for his or her actions. Over the course of the 1760s and 1770s, Kant changes his mind on both points, requiring for significant human freedom both that we can do otherwise than we do, and that we are ultimately responsible for our actions. The freedom that satisfies both conditions is what Kant calls ‘transcendental freedom’. Kant’s shifting position is located with reference to Leibniz, Crusius, and Rousseau. The chapter draws upon Kant’s reflections on Rousseau in the early 1760s, his Only Possible Argument, related Reflexionen from the mid-1760s, and ‘Lectures on Metaphysics’ from the 1770s. The chapter engages in particular with Pereboom, Ameriks, and Kain.
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