The Problem

Abstract

This chapter traces Kant’s shift from an incompatibilist to a compatibilist conception of human freedom: in the 1750s Kant considers that human freedom does not require the agent to be able to do otherwise, nor does Kant require the agent to be ultimately responsible for his or her actions. Over the course of the 1760s and 1770s, Kant changes his mind on both points, requiring for significant human freedom both that we can do otherwise than we do, and that we are ultimately responsible for our actions. The freedom that satisfies both conditions is what Kant calls ‘transcendental freedom’. Kant’s shifting position is located with reference to Leibniz, Crusius, and Rousseau. The chapter draws upon Kant’s reflections on Rousseau in the early 1760s, his Only Possible Argument, related Reflexionen from the mid-1760s, and ‘Lectures on Metaphysics’ from the 1770s. The chapter engages in particular with Pereboom, Ameriks, and Kain.

Free Will, Foreknowledge, and Creation: Further Explorations of Kant’s Molinism

“…It is, however, not exclusively about free human actions . Libera here rather refers to God’s free will as the ground, or at least part of the ground, of the contingent truths of the actual world and hence ultimately to God’s freedom with regard to creating the entities, which make up the core of the actual world (see Insole 2013: 29–57 and Kain 2021). This is of particular importance for the following reason.…”

“… 4 The most comprehensive accounts of divine foreknowledge and human freedom, and creation and human freedom, in Kant to date have been provided by Hogan (2014) and Insole (2013), respectively. …”

“… 24 Insole (2013) holds that the critical Kant is a mere conservationist and that while mere conservationism, in Insole’s opinion, by itself does not undercut compatibility, he takes Kant to hold an incompatibilist position in his critical period with reference to theology by virtue of Kant’s stance on concursus . Mere conservationism implies that apart from keeping things in themselves in existence God does not contribute causally to their actions ‘after’ creating them.…”