SummaryWhen a novel influenza A virus with pandemic potential emerges, nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) often are the most readily available interventions to help slow transmission of the virus in communities, which is especially important before a pandemic vaccine becomes widely available. NPIs, also known as community mitigation measures, are actions that persons and communities can take to help slow the spread of respiratory virus infections, including seasonal and pandemic influenza viruses.These guidelines replace the 2007 Interim Pre-pandemic Planning Guidance: Community Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Mitigation in the United States — Early, Targeted, Layered Use of Nonpharmaceutical Interventions (https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/11425). Several elements remain unchanged from the 2007 guidance, which described recommended NPIs and the supporting rationale and key concepts for the use of these interventions during influenza pandemics. NPIs can be phased in, or layered, on the basis of pandemic severity and local transmission patterns over time. Categories of NPIs include personal protective measures for everyday use (e.g., voluntary home isolation of ill persons, respiratory etiquette, and hand hygiene); personal protective measures reserved for influenza pandemics (e.g., voluntary home quarantine of exposed household members and use of face masks in community settings when ill); community measures aimed at increasing social distancing (e.g., school closures and dismissals, social distancing in workplaces, and postponing or cancelling mass gatherings); and environmental measures (e.g., routine cleaning of frequently touched surfaces).Several new elements have been incorporated into the 2017 guidelines. First, to support updated recommendations on the use of NPIs, the latest scientific evidence available since the influenza A (H1N1)pdm09 pandemic has been added. Second, a summary of lessons learned from the 2009 H1N1 pandemic response is presented to underscore the importance of broad and flexible prepandemic planning. Third, a new section on community engagement has been included to highlight that the timely and effective use of NPIs depends on community acceptance and active participation. Fourth, to provide new or updated pandemic assessment and planning tools, the novel influenza virus pandemic intervals tool, the Influenza Risk Assessment Tool, the Pandemic Severity Assessment Framework, and a set of prepandemic planning scenarios are described. Finally, to facilitate implementation of the updated guidelines and to assist states and localities with prepandemic planning and decision-making, this report links to six supplemental prepandemic NPI planning guides for different community settings that are available online (https://www.cdc.gov/nonpharmaceutical-interventions).

BackgroundThis study explored the effect of screening and treatment of refugees for latent tuberculosis infection (LTBI) before entrance to the United States as a strategy for reducing active tuberculosis (TB). The purpose of this study was to estimate the costs and benefits of LTBI screening and treatment in United States bound refugees prior to arrival.MethodsCosts were included for foreign and domestic LTBI screening and treatment and the domestic treatment of active TB. A decision tree with multiple Markov nodes was developed to determine the total costs and number of active TB cases that occurred in refugee populations that tested 55, 35, and 20 % tuberculin skin test positive under two models: no overseas LTBI screening and overseas LTBI screening and treatment. For this analysis, refugees that tested 55, 35, and 20 % tuberculin skin test positive were divided into high, moderate, and low LTBI prevalence categories to denote their prevalence of LTBI relative to other refugee populations.ResultsFor a hypothetical 1-year cohort of 100,000 refugees arriving in the United States from regions with high, moderate, and low LTBI prevalence, implementation of overseas screening would be expected to prevent 440, 220, and 57 active TB cases in the United States during the first 20 years after arrival. The cost savings associated with treatment of these averted cases would offset the cost of LTBI screening and treatment for refugees from countries with high (net cost-saving: $4.9 million) and moderate (net cost-saving: $1.6 million) LTBI prevalence. For low LTBI prevalence populations, LTBI screening and treatment exceed expected future TB treatment cost savings (net cost of $780,000).ConclusionsImplementing LTBI screening and treatment for United States bound refugees from countries with high or moderate LTBI prevalence would potentially save millions of dollars and contribute to United States TB elimination goals. These estimates are conservative since secondary transmission from tuberculosis cases in the United States was not considered in the model.Electronic supplementary materialThe online version of this article (doi:10.1186/s12889-015-2530-7) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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In February 2020, during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, 232 evacuees from Wuhan, China, were placed under federal 14-day quarantine upon arrival at a US military base in San Diego, California. We describe the monitoring of evacuees and responders for symptoms of COVID-19, case and contact investigations, infection control procedures, and lessons learned to inform future quarantine protocols for evacuated people from a hot spot resulting from a novel pathogen. Thirteen (5.6%) evacuees had COVID-19–compatible symptoms and 2 (0.9%) had laboratory-confirmed SARS-CoV-2. Two case investigations identified 43 contacts; 3 (7.0%) contacts had symptoms but tested negative for SARS-CoV-2 infection. Daily symptom and temperature screening of evacuees and enacted infection control procedures resulted in rapid case identification and isolation and no detected secondary transmission among evacuees or responders. Lessons learned highlight the challenges associated with public health response to a novel pathogen and the evolution of mitigation strategies as knowledge of the pathogen evolves.