Is communicating anger or threats more effective in eliciting concessions in negotiation? Recent research has emphasized the effectiveness of anger communication, an emotional strategy. In this article, we argue that anger communication conveys an implied threat, and we document that issuing threats is a more effective negotiation strategy than communicating anger. In 3 computer-mediated negotiation experiments, participants received either angry or threatening messages from a simulated counterpart. Experiment 1 showed that perceptions of threat mediated the effect of anger (vs. a control) on concessions. Experiment 2 showed that (a) threat communication elicited greater concessions than anger communication and (b) poise (being confident and in control of one's own feelings and decisions) ascribed to the counterpart mediated the positive effect of threat compared to anger on concessions. Experiment 3 replicated this positive effect of threat over anger when recipients had an attractive alternative to a negotiated agreement. These findings qualify previous research on anger communication in negotiation. Implications for the understanding of emotion and negotiation are discussed.

Although recently some research has been accumulated on emotional expressions in negotiations, there is little research on whether expressing sadness could have any effect in negotiations. We propose that sadness expressions can increase the expressers' ability to claim value in negotiations because they make recipients experience greater other-concern for the expresser. However, only when the social situation provides recipients with reasons to experience concern for the expresser in the first place, will recipients act on their other-concern and, eventually, concede more to a sad expresser. Three experiments tested this proposition by examining face-to-face, actual negotiations (in which participants interacted with each other). In all 3 experiments, recipients conceded more to a sad expresser when, but only when, features of the social situation provided reasons to experience other-concern for the expresser, namely (a) when recipients perceived the expresser as low power (Experiment 1), (b) when recipients anticipated a future interaction (Experiment 1), (c) when recipients construed the relationship as collaborative in nature (Experiment 2), or (d) when recipients believed that it was inappropriate to blame others (Experiment 3). All 3 experiments showed that the positive effect of sadness expression was mediated by the recipients' greater other-concern. These findings extend previous research on emotional expressions in negotiations by emphasizing a distinct psychological mechanism. Implications for our understanding of sadness, negotiations, and emotions are discussed.

M@n@gement est la revue officielle de l'AIMS M@n@gement is the journal official of AIMS Le rôle de l'émotion dans la prise de décision intuitive : zoom sur les réalisateursdécideurs en période de tournage

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We examined how the minority's perceived (i.e., not real) expertise affects group discussion and performance. In two experiments, participants were randomly assigned to interacting groups in which the minority faction was perceived as either expert or not. Groups performed a decision task that involved solving a murder mystery. Both experiments showed that minorities perceived as expert (vs. not perceived as expert) made majority individuals acquire more accurate private judgments after group discussion, although the public group decision was not more accurate. In parallel, perceived expertise made minority members change their own judgments less. Experiment 1 also showed that minorities' questioning behaviors mediated the effect of minorities' perceived expertise on majority members' private accuracy. Experiment 2 further showed that majority members' deeper processing was also a mediator. Thus, minorities with perceived expertise serve as a catalyst, increasing the quality of majority members' cognitions, but not their own.