When entering a horizontal logistics alliance, companies can expect a significant cost decrease. In this paper, we show that when the partners in an alliance adopt a flexible attitude (i.e. allow changes to the terms of their deliveries), the total cost can be further decreased. We argue that the method used to allocate the total cost to the different partners should therefore encourage such flexibility. A case study of three companies in Belgium achieves a 25.83% decrease in transportation costs. Allocating this collaborative gain with the Shapley value, the individual gains range from 19.01% to 37.56%. By allowing changes to delivery dates and allowing large orders to be split into several deliveries, the partners in the alliance can increase the collaborative gain and their individual gains. The Shapley value is found to encourage flexibility.

Determining the optimal number and location of intermodal transshipment terminals is a decision that strongly influences the viability of the intermodal transportation alternative. In this paper, we develop a model and an optimization method that provides policy makers with a tool to help them take these decisions.

Horizontal collaboration among shippers is gaining traction as a way to increase logistic efficiency. The total distribution cost of a logistic coalition is generally between 9% and 30% lower than the sum of costs of each partner distributing separately. However, the coalition gain is highly dependent on the flexibility that each partner allows in its delivery terms. Flexible delivery dates, flexible order sizes, order splitting rules, etc., allow the coalition to exploit more opportunities for optimization and create better and cheaper distribution plans.An important challenge in a logistic coalition is the division (or sharing) of the coalition gain. Several methods have been proposed for this purpose, often stemming from the field of game theory. This paper states that an adequate gain sharing method should not only be fair, but should also reward flexibility in order to persuade companies to relax their delivery terms. Methods that limit the criteria for cost allocation to the marginal costs and the values of the subcoalitions are found to be able to generate adequate incentives for companies to adopt a flexible position. In a coalition of two partners however, we show that these methods are not able to correctly evaluate an asymmetric effort to be more flexible. For this situation, we suggest an alternative approach to better measure and reward the value of flexibility.

a b s t r a c tA model is proposed that integrates a cost allocation method -the Shapley value -into the optimization of the synchronized consolidation of transportation orders. By balancing each partner's delivery date changes (when synchronizing) against its allocated profit, it ensures that the operational plan is acceptable by all partners. In comparison to a model that first plans and then divides the costs, this model limits expensive delivery date changes and does not systematically favor a company with a slightly higher cost of change.

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