Mismatch negativity (MMN) in response to deviation from physical sound parameters (e.g., pitch, duration) is reduced in individuals with long-term schizophrenia (Sz), suggesting deficits in deviance detection. However, MMN can appear at several time intervals as part of deviance detection. Understanding which part of the processing stream is abnormal in Sz is crucial for understanding MMN pathophysiology. We measured MMN to complex pattern deviants, which have been shown to produce multiple MMNs in healthy controls (HC). Both simple and complex MMNs were recorded from 27 Sz and 27 matched HC. For simple MMN, pitch- and duration-deviants were presented among frequent standard tones. For complex MMN, patterns of five single tones were repeatedly presented, with the occasional deviant group of tones containing an extra sixth tone. Sz showed smaller pitch MMN (p=.009, ~110ms) and duration MMN (p=.030, ~170ms) than healthy controls. For complex MMN, there were two deviance-related negativities. The first (~150ms) was not significantly different between HC and SZ. The second was significantly reduced in Sz (p=.011, ~400ms). The topography of the late complex MMN was consistent with generators in anterior temporal cortex. Worse late MMN in Sz was associated with increased emotional withdrawal, poor attention, lack of spontaneity/conversation, and increased preoccupation. Late MMN blunting in schizophrenia suggests a deficit in later stages of deviance processing. Correlations with negative symptoms measures are preliminary, but suggest that abnormal complex auditory perceptual processes may compound higher-order cognitive and social deficits in the disorder.

Some studies suggest that individuals with autism spectrum disorder have reduced emotional empathy while others do not. The presence of co-occurring alexithymia in autism spectrum disorder and differences in interoception have been associated with reductions in empathic ability. To fully explore the relationships between interoception, alexithymia, and emotional empathy, we collected self-report and interview data in 35 youth with autism spectrum disorder and 40 typically developing controls (ages 8–17 years). The autism spectrum disorder sample had increased alexithymia and physiological hyperarousal compared to typically developing controls, but there were no group differences in interoception or emotional empathy. Alexithymia severity correlated with higher personal distress in both groups and with lower empathic concern in the autism spectrum disorder group. Within the autism spectrum disorder group, higher incidence of reports of bodily sensation when describing emotional experience correlated with lower personal distress and lower alexithymia. In addition, although empathic concern was negatively correlated with alexithymia in the autism spectrum disorder group, across groups, the alexithymia hypothesis was supported in only the personal distress domain of emotional empathy. These results suggest emotional empathy; personal distress, in particular, is not intrinsically impaired in autism spectrum disorder. Lay abstract Empathy, the ability to understand and share the emotions of others, is a necessary skill for social functioning and can be categorized into cognitive and emotional empathy. There is evidence to suggest that individuals with autism spectrum disorder have difficulties with cognitive empathy, the ability to imagine how another person is thinking or feeling. However, it is unclear if individuals with autism spectrum disorder struggle with emotional empathy, the ability to share and feel emotions others are experiencing. Self-report and interview data were collected to explore the relationships between interoception (individuals’ self-reported awareness of sensation from their body such as thirst, heartbeat, etc.), alexithymia (an individual’s ability to describe and distinguish between their own emotions), and emotional empathy in 35 youth with autism spectrum disorder and 40 typically developing youth. Greater personal distress to others’ emotions and greater difficulty describing and recognizing self-emotions were associated with reporting fewer physical sensations in the body when experiencing emotion in the autism spectrum disorder group. The results of this study suggest that while autism spectrum disorder youth with concomitant alexithymia may experience emotional empathy differently, it should not be characterized as an absence of a capacity for emotional empathy.

Previous research has shown that individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and developmental coordination disorder (DCD) may have overlapping social and motor skill impairments. This study compares ASD, DCD, and typically developing (TD) youth on a range of social, praxis and motor skills, and investigates the relationship between these skills in each group. Data were collected on participants aged 8–17 (n = 33 ASD, n = 28 DCD, n = 35 TD). Overall, the clinical groups showed some similar patterns of social and motor impairments but diverged in praxis impairments, cognitive empathy, and Theory of Mind ability. When controlling for both social and motor performance impairments, the ASD group showed significantly lower accuracy on imitation of meaningful gestures and gesture to command, indicating a prominent deficit in these praxis skills in ASD. Lay Summary Individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and developmental coordination disorder (DCD) have social and motor skill impairments to varying degrees. This study compares ASD, DCD, and typically developing (TD) youth on a range of social, praxis, and motor skills. ASD and DCD shared similar patterns of gross and fine motor skills, but differed in skills related to making gestures. Specifically, our results also suggest that ASD has a prominent deficit in gesture performance and meaningful imitation compared to TD and DCD groups.

Sensory processing and motor coordination atypicalities are not commonly identified as primary characteristics of autism spectrum disorder (ASD), nor are they well captured in the NIMH’s original Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) framework. Here, motor and sensory features performed similarly to RDoC features in support vector classification of 30 ASD youth against 33 typically developing controls. Combining sensory with RDoC features boosted classification performance, achieving a Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC) of 0.949 and balanced accuracy (BAcc) of 0.971 (p = 0.00020, calculated against a permuted null distribution). Sensory features alone successfully classified ASD (MCC = 0.565, BAcc = 0.773, p = 0.0222) against a clinically relevant control group of 26 youth with Developmental Coordination Disorder (DCD) and were in fact required to decode against DCD above chance. These findings highlight the importance of sensory and motor features to the ASD phenotype and their relevance to the RDoC framework.

A deficit in pre‐cognitively mirroring other people's actions and experiences may be related to the social impairments observed in autism spectrum disorder (ASD). However, it is unclear whether such embodied simulation deficits are unique to ASD or instead are related to motor impairment, which is commonly comorbid with ASD. Here we aim to disentangle how, neurologically, motor impairments contribute to simulation deficits and identify unique neural signatures of ASD. We compare children with ASD (N = 30) to children with Developmental Coordination Disorder (DCD; N = 23) as well as a typically developing group (N = 33) during fMRI tasks in which children observe, imitate, and mentalize about other people's actions. Results indicate a unique neural signature in ASD: during action observation, only the ASD group shows hypoactivity in a region important for simulation (inferior frontal gyrus, pars opercularis, IFGop). However, during a motor production task (imitation), the IFGop is hypoactive for both ASD and DCD groups. For all tasks, we find correlations across groups with motor ability, even after controlling for age, IQ, and social impairment. Conversely, across groups, mentalizing ability is correlated with activity in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex when controlling for motor ability. These findings help identify the unique neurobiological basis of ASD for aspects of social processing. Furthermore, as no previous fMRI studies correlated brain activity with motor impairment in ASD, these findings help explain prior conflicting reports in these simulation networks.