This paper analyzes the factors impacting partnering decisions in venture capital syndicates using a unique data set of 2,373 venture capitalist (VC) transactions in Germany. We employ a signaling perspective to partner–selection strategies within VC syndicates. By including time–varying information about industry experience and cooperation patterns, we explicitly take into account not only the changing social context for partner selection, but also the dynamic nature of signals sent and received. Our analysis documents that the informativeness of investment experience as a signal depends on the existence and frequency of previous joint deals with the lead VC. Experience becomes a much stronger signal if previous invitations to syndicates are bilateral rather than unilateral. The willingness to invite others to deals signals the ability to reciprocate through one's own deal flow. Moreover, we show how the value of signals erodes over time, that is, information from the previous year carries more informational value than signals from more distant years. In sum, the data reveal that different signals carry weight for lead VCs, and that the frequency of signals sent and the stage of development of the portfolio firm positively moderate the value and relevance of signaling behavior. While early stage investments are mainly characterized by need to diversify and to spread risks, value–added advice is necessary in later rounds, and hence, the strength of the signals sent and received gain in relevance and in value.
Overview■ In this paper we test a dynamic agency model. The incentive compatible contract is non-monotone and does not award the highest pay to the most successful agent. Based on the assumption that agents are rational we expect them to choose high effort despite the non-monotonicity of the contract.■ Four treatments with differing information structures are analyzed: a neutral treamtent, a framing treatment, and two framing treatments with two players, agent and principal. Overall, the experiments confirm the model and show that the non-monotone contract has the desired incentive effects. Furthermore, principals strictly prefer the non-monotone contract over a monotone contract that would ex ante lead to a lower expected surplus for them. Observed learning behavior of agents accords with learning direction theory.■ Possible extensions of the experiments to analyze the impact of fairness and reciprocity in detail are discussed. In that respect, the study serves as a benchmark study to derive answers about the practical applicability of non-monotone pay schemes which are often viewed as non-plausible labor contracts. 351
Employee performance evaluations usually take place on an annual basis but quarterly, monthly, or weekly evaluations are by no means exceptional. If their outcomes determine variable pay, finding the optimal frequency of performance evaluations is far from a trivial task. This paper investigates the benefit of intertemporal aggregation of performance measures in a two-period agency with a non-stationary production technology and shows that infrequent evaluation can be efficient even if there is complementarity between tasks in different periods. When the principal cannot fully commit to a two-period contract, the benefit of aggregation is yet larger.
In this paper the impact of ability and learning potential on incentive contracts is analyzed. A central feature of the model is that the true ability will not be revealed. The learning potential of an agent is modeled as the magnitude of impact on the agent's expected ability that learning-by-doing has in a given task. Absent a managerial labor market, depending on an agent's learning potential, a monotone or non-monotone pay structure may be optimal. The second important result is that using agents' ability distributions as inputs to information systems, higher learning potentials lead to less costly information systems, i.e. actions can be implemented at lower costs. Additionally, it is proven that the criteria cost minimization and value maximization are equivalent in the model's context. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
In this work, we explore the link between electronic word of mouth in the form of user-generated content (online forum interactions on Kickstarter) and through mass personal communication (sharing information through Facebook) on the performance of crowdfunding campaigns. Our formal theoretical model implies that the efficiency of electronic word of mouth is determined by the quality of the underlying crowdfunding campaign. Using a sample of 572 project observations, we test our theoretical predictions in cross-sectional logistic regression and ancillary Granger analyses. Our results highlight the interactive contingency of social media engagement and the success of the crowdfunding campaign. While a higher quality campaign is benefitting from user generated electronic word of mouth (online comments), the returns are diminishing. For mass personal electronic word of mouth (Facebook shares), we even find a reverse causal effect. Social media activity follows a successful campaign, but does not affect the success probability of the campaign. Crowdfunding campaigns need to approach their social media activities with a certain note of sensitivity to achieve the objective of successfully reaching their campaign goal.
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