Visual perception is based on information processing during periods of eye fixations that are interrupted by fast saccadic eye movements. The ability to sample and relate information on task-relevant objects across fixations implies that correspondence between presaccadic and postsaccadic objects is established. Postsaccadic object information usually updates and overwrites information on the corresponding presaccadic object. The presaccadic object representation is then lost. In contrast, the presaccadic object is conserved when object correspondence is broken. This helps transsaccadic memory but it may impose attentional costs on object recognition. Therefore, we investigated how breaking object correspondence across the saccade affects postsaccadic object recognition. In Experiment 1, object correspondence was broken by a brief postsaccadic blank screen. Observers made a saccade to a peripheral object which was displaced during the saccade. This object reappeared either immediately after the saccade or after the blank screen. Within the postsaccadic object, a letter was briefly presented (terminated by a mask). Observers reported displacement direction and letter identity in different blocks. Breaking object correspondence by blanking improved displacement identification but deteriorated postsaccadic letter recognition. In Experiment 2, object correspondence was broken by changing the object’s contrast-polarity. There were no object displacements and observers only reported letter identity. Again, breaking object correspondence deteriorated postsaccadic letter recognition. These findings identify transsaccadic object correspondence as a key determinant of object recognition across the saccade. This is in line with the recent hypothesis that breaking object correspondence results in separate representations of presaccadic and postsaccadic objects which then compete for limited attentional processing resources (Schneider, 2013). Postsaccadic object recognition is then deteriorated because less resources are available for processing postsaccadic objects.

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Rapid saccadic eye movements bring the foveal region of the eye's retina onto objects for high-acuity vision. Saccades change the location and resolution of objects' retinal images. To perceive objects as visually stable across saccades, correspondence between the objects before and after the saccade must be established. We have previously shown that breaking object correspondence across the saccade causes a decrement in object recognition (Poth, Herwig, & Schneider, 2015). Color and luminance can establish object correspondence, but it is unknown how these surface features contribute to transsaccadic visual processing. Here, we investigated whether changing the surface features color-and-luminance and color alone across saccades impairs postsaccadic object recognition. Participants made saccades to peripheral objects, which either maintained or changed their surface features across the saccade. After the saccade, participants briefly viewed a letter within the saccade target object (terminated by a pattern mask). Postsaccadic object recognition was assessed as participants' accuracy in reporting the letter. Experiment A used the colors green and red with different luminances as surface features, Experiment B blue and yellow with approximately the same luminances. Changing the surface features across the saccade deteriorated postsaccadic object recognition in both experiments. These findings reveal a link between object recognition and object correspondence relying on the surface features colors and luminance, which is currently not addressed in theories of transsaccadic perception. We interpret the findings within a recent theory ascribing this link to visual attention (Schneider, 2013).

Neuropsychological assessment of human visual processing capabilities strongly depends on visual testing conditions including room lighting, stimuli, and viewing-distance. This limits standardization, threatens reliability, and prevents the assessment of core visual functions such as visual processing speed. Increasingly available virtual reality devices allow to address these problems. One such device is the portable, light-weight, and easy-to-use Oculus Rift. It is head-mounted and covers the entire visual field, thereby shielding and standardizing the visual stimulation. A fundamental prerequisite to use Oculus Rift for neuropsychological assessment is sufficient test-retest reliability. Here, we compare the test-retest reliabilities of Bundesen’s visual processing components (visual processing speed, threshold of conscious perception, capacity of visual working memory) as measured with Oculus Rift and a standard CRT computer screen. Our results show that Oculus Rift allows to measure the processing components as reliably as the standard CRT. This means that Oculus Rift is applicable for standardized and reliable assessment and diagnosis of elementary cognitive functions in laboratory and clinical settings. Oculus Rift thus provides the opportunity to compare visual processing components between individuals and institutions and to establish statistical norm distributions.

Object perception across saccadic eye movements is assumed to result from integrating two information sources: incoming peripheral object information and information from a foveal prediction (Herwig and Schneider, J Exp Psychol Gen 143(5):1903-1922, 2014, Herwig, J Vis 15(16), 7, 2015). Predictions are supposed to be based on transsaccadic associations of peripheral and foveal object information. The main function of these predictions may be to conceal discrepancies in resolution and locations across saccades. Here we ask how predictions are affected by discrepancies between peripheral and foveal objects. Participants learned unfamiliar transsaccadic associations by making saccades to objects whose shape systematically changed during the saccade. Importantly, we manipulated the size of this change between participants to induce different magnitudes of object discrepancy. In a subsequent test, we found that judgment shifts of peripheral shape perception toward the predicted foveal input depended on change size during acquisition. Specifically, the contribution of prediction decreased for large changes but did not reach zero, showing that even for large changes (i.e., square to circle or vice versa) the prediction was not ignored completely. These findings indicate that object discrepancy during learning determines how much the resulting foveal prediction contributes to perception in the periphery.

The Trail-Making-Test (TMT) is one of the most widely used neuropsychological tests for assessing executive functions, the brain functions underlying cognitively controlled thought and action. Obtaining a number of test scores at once, the TMT allows to characterize an assortment of executive functions efficiently. Critically, however, as most test scores are derived from test completion times, the scores only provide a summary measure of various cognitive control processes. To address this problem, we extended the TMT in two ways. First, using a computerized eye-tracking version of the TMT, we added specific eye movement measures that deliver a richer set of data with a higher degree of cognitive process specificity. Second, we included an experimental manipulation of a fundamental executive function, namely participants’ ability to emphasize speed or accuracy in task performance. Our study of healthy participants showed that eye movement measures differed between TMT conditions that are usually compared to assess the cognitive control process of alternating between task sets for action control. This demonstrates that eye movement measures are indeed sensitive to executive functions implicated in the TMT. Crucially, comparing performance under cognitive control sets of speed vs. accuracy emphasis revealed which test scores primarily varied due to this manipulation (e.g., trial duration, number of fixations), and which were still more sensitive to other differences between individuals (e.g., fixation duration, saccade amplitude). This provided an experimental construct validation of the test scores by distinguishing scores primarily reflecting the executive function of emphasizing speed vs. accuracy and those independent from it. In sum, both the inclusion of eye movement measures and of the experimental manipulation of executive functions in the TMT enabled a more specific interpretation of the TMT in terms of cognitive functions and mechanisms, which offers more precise diagnoses in clinical applications and basic research.

Monitoring the environment for visual events while performing a concurrent task requires adjustment of visual processing priorities. By use of Bundesen’s (1990) Theory of Visual Attention, we investigated how monitoring for an object-based brief event affected distinct components of visual attention in a concurrent task. The perceptual salience of the event was varied. Monitoring reduced the processing speed in the concurrent task, and the reduction was stronger when the event was less salient. The monitoring task neither affected the temporal threshold of conscious perception nor the storage capacity of visual short-term memory nor the efficiency of top-down controlled attentional selection.

Intelligent behavior requires to act directed by goals despite competing action tendencies triggered by stimuli in the environment. For eye movements, it has recently been discovered that this ability is briefly reduced in urgent situations (Salinas et al., 2019). In a time-window before an urgent response, participants could not help but look at a suddenly appearing visual stimulus, even though their goal was to look away from it. Urgency seemed to provoke a new visual–oculomotor phenomenon: A period in which saccadic eye movements are dominated by external stimuli, and uncontrollable by current goals. This period was assumed to arise from brain mechanisms controlling eye movements and spatial attention, such as those of the frontal eye field. Here, we show that the phenomenon is more general than previously thought. We found that also in well-investigated manual tasks, urgency made goal-conflicting stimulus features dominate behavioral responses. This dominance of behavior followed established trial-to-trial signatures of cognitive control mechanisms that replicate across a variety of tasks. Thus together, these findings reveal that urgency temporarily forces stimulus-driven action by overcoming cognitive control in general, not only at brain mechanisms controlling eye movements.