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Generalisation about African politics and political systems is made difficult by the extent to which African states both differ from one another and have changed since independence. This article discusses whether it is nevertheless possible to understand African states as examples of the same political system, as some recent studies have asserted (or assumed). It argues that by comparing the historical patterns of political development in African states, one can identify a limited number of distinct historical paths, starting with the process of decolonisation (where there are two variants). Subsequently divergent paths arose from differing responses to early post‐independence political crises, producing contrasting forms of politics ‐ ‘centralised‐bureaucratic politics’ and ‘spoils politics’ ‐ and corresponding political systems. Further differentiation has arisen systematically from popular responses to the breakdown of these forms, giving rise to populist revolts, state collapse or to democratic challenges (and sometimes democratic restructuring). Each of these represents a distinct form of politics, and political systems, within Africa. A model of the process of political development in post‐war Africa is set out along these lines, and used to criticise several recent attempts at characterisation of African politics, in which either states belonging to one historical path (and thus one political system) are treated as representative of all African states, or in which states from different paths and belonging to different systems are seen as examples of the same political form and political process.

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African politics in the nineties have been marked by a series of violent breakdowns of order, and in some cases the disappearance of the central state, in a large number of states. Attempts at the analysis of this phenomenon have involved several different but complementary approaches, notably those invoking globalisation, the economics of ‘new’ war, the crisis of the neopatrimonial state, or social and cultural factors as keys to explanation. These either confine themselves to case studies, or treat all instances of endemic violence as open to the same analysis, in part because they treat violence or warfare as themselves the central objects of analysis. An alternative approach does not see ‘war’ as the problem, but is instead concerned with the historical circumstances within which endemic violence occurs and which can be seen as possible causes of that violence. This approach allows for the simultaneous existence of several different historical sequences involving war and violence, and identifies one key category of cases of endemic violence which covers the great majority of those cases in the nineties: violence associated with the process of state collapse in Africa. It attributes the origins of violence in these cases to the degeneration of their ‘spoils politics’ systems under the impact of their internal dynamics, accelerated by economic decline since 1980 and the end of the Cold War. As spoils systems develop into ‘terminal spoils’, so violence intensifies and takes on new but necessary forms, and a process of state collapse begins, interacting with the growth of violence in ways that accelerate both.

This paper argues that social welfare research on joined-up thinking is underpinned by two theses. The 'systemic move' thesis suggests that joined-up thinking is needed to fill gaps in welfare service provision arising from a lack of interorganizational co-ordination. The 'epistemological move' thesis advises that joined-up thinking is needed to overcome deficiencies in the institutional division and distribution of welfare knowledge. Both theses macro-systematize blame for previous social welfare failures, and both are teleological because they present joined-up thinking as a progressive solution that results in a more effective (and thus less fallible) welfare system. In this paper, I argue thatjoined-up thinking can also create a new economy of welfare professional power. First, I show how some versions of 'joined-up' thinking manifest themselves in holistic practices that can 'see everything', 'know everything' and 'do anything', and thus a 'holistic power' to discipline and control every aspect of welfare recipients lives. Since holistic power is seen as infallible, its failure to produce 'active bodies' necessitates the creation of secondary 'joined-up powers' that individualize blame and exclude those to blame from welfare resources. These 'secondary powers' match the social disciplines enforced by one welfare agency (e.g. the responsibility to work enforced by the employment service) with legal rights under another agency (e.g. the right to housing from social landlords), so that breach of the former leads to exclusion from the latter. I conclude that this power strategy is primitive and punitive because it simply excludes welfare recipients. Exclusion is also uneconomic because it pushes welfare recipients into the shade of welfare institutional power.