Understanding African politics

Abstract

Generalisation about African politics and political systems is made difficult by the extent to which African states both differ from one another and have changed since independence. This article discusses whether it is nevertheless possible to understand African states as examples of the same political system, as some recent studies have asserted (or assumed). It argues that by comparing the historical patterns of political development in African states, one can identify a limited number of distinct historical paths, starting with the process of decolonisation (where there are two variants). Subsequently divergent paths arose from differing responses to early post‐independence political crises, producing contrasting forms of politics ‐ ‘centralised‐bureaucratic politics’ and ‘spoils politics’ ‐ and corresponding political systems. Further differentiation has arisen systematically from popular responses to the breakdown of these forms, giving rise to populist revolts, state collapse or to democratic challenges (and sometimes democratic restructuring). Each of these represents a distinct form of politics, and political systems, within Africa. A model of the process of political development in post‐war Africa is set out along these lines, and used to criticise several recent attempts at characterisation of African politics, in which either states belonging to one historical path (and thus one political system) are treated as representative of all African states, or in which states from different paths and belonging to different systems are seen as examples of the same political form and political process.

Going with the Grain in African Development?

“…In the run up to independence political tribalism was transitorily eclipsed, but afterwards it reasserted itself with a vengeance in most countries (for overviews see Allen, 1995;Young, 1986). For the most part, the new states disregarded ethnic difference in their national constitutions and political institutions, and privileged the idea of the nation in official ideology, 'For the nation to live, the tribe must die', said Samora Machel, typifying nationalist leaders' ambition to work against the grain (cited in Berman 1998, 306).…”

Eroding Local Capacity: International Humanitarian Action in Africa

“…Elite networks used and abused the state. When Siad Barre no longer could feed his client-networks through the management of central-bureaucratic policies, spoils politics appeared in full force (Allen, 1995). The crisis of clientelism in Somalia broke out into open conflict when those excluded from power tried to avoid permanent exclusion by utilizing existing or potential communal divisions.…”

“…In the words of Chris Allen, "spoils politics can be seen as an extreme version of clientelist crisis, going as far as the complete breakdown of the system, and the abandonment of all restraint" (Allen, 1995). In Somalia, the unresolved clientelist crisis took the form of state collapse, crude military repression, counter-insurgencies, and decentralized, clan-based violence.…”

12. Governance and Politics

“…A widespread analysis is that postcolonial politics 9 in most sub-Saharan African countries can be characterised as what has come to be known variously as clientelism, neo-patrimonialism or prebendalism (Bates 1981, Sandbrook 1985, Hyden 1983, Diamond 1987, Bayart 1993, Chabal and Daloz 1999, van de Walle 2001. These terms describe a political system based on exchanges between political patrons, dispensing "privileged access to state resources, rationed by state leaders following a strict political logic" (van de Walle 2001: 50) and clients offering political support and allegiance in exchange (Allen 1995: 304-5, see also Cammack 2007b, Clapham 1982. State resources were thus used not only for personal self-enrichment (although this certainly went on) but for political purposes.…”

“…Importantly, there have been considerable variations in developmental performance between regimes were all based on patrimonial politics (Allen 1995, Crook 2010, Kelsall and Booth 2010. Some countries have seen state collapse and barbaric conflict; other have had greater stability and much better economic performance and development outcomes than the African average (Kelsall andBooth 2010, Booth andGolooba-Mutebi 2011).…”