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Tall cell variant (TCV) of papillary thyroid carcinoma (PTC) has been recognized for the past few decades as an entity showing aggressive biological behavior; however, there is considerable controversy regarding the definition, clinical and pathological features of TCV because of its rarity and difficult diagnosis. No clinical features can accurately diagnose TCV. Thus, the results of histocytology, immunohistochemistry and molecular genetics tests have important clinical implications for diagnosis. Given the aggressiveness and the increased recurrence and poor survival rates, more aggressive treatment approach and rigorous follow-up is required for patients with TCV. In the present article, we undertook a comprehensive review to summarize and discuss the various aspects of this variant, from morphology to immunohistochemistry, and molecular abnormalities from a practical and daily practice-oriented point of view.

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We constructed a Stackelberg game in a supply chain finance (SCF) system including a manufacturer, a capital‐constrained retailer, and a bank that provides loans on the basis of the manufacturer's credit guarantee. To emphasize the financial service providers' risks, we assumed that both the bank and the manufacturer are risk‐averse and formulated trade‐off objective functions for both of them as the convex combination of the expected profit and conditional value‐at‐risk. To explore the effects of the risk preferences and decision preferences on SCF equilibriums, we mathematically analyzed the optimal order quantities, wholesale prices, and interest rates under different risk preference scenarios and performed numerical analyses to quantify the effects. We found that incorporating bank credit with a credit guarantee can effectively balance the retailer's financing risk between the bank and the manufacturer through interest rate charging and wholesale pricing. Moreover, SCF equilibriums with risk aversion are highly affected by the degree of both the lender's and guarantor's risk tolerance in regard to the borrower's default probability and will be more conservative than those in the risk‐neutral cases that only maximize expected profit.

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