This study investigates manufacturers' online channel introduction strategies by considering two typical retailing formats, namely, reselling and agency selling. Online spillover effect and contract negotiation are considered to make the model more consistent with practice. We find that with a strong bargaining power, the manufacturer will always be profitable when it introduces online channels, whether it is reselling or agency selling. Meanwhile, agency selling is always profitable for the manufacturer than reselling. Interestingly, we find that an incentive alignment exists when two online channels are introduced, where agency selling is profitable for both the manufacturer and the e‐commerce platforms (EPs).
This paper considers the issues of pricing, lot-sizing decisions and coordination in a supply chain consisting of one original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and one contract manufacturer (CM). A Bayesian game accounting for asymmetric information is established to optimize the CM’s outsourcing price and the OEM’s selling price. A Stackelberg game incorporating yield and demand uncertainties is subsequently modeled to optimize the CM’s production quantity and the OEM’s order quantity. Finally, a shortage penalty with surplus purchase contract is proposed to coordinate the supply chain. It is found that the optimal outsourcing price is either the lower limit or the stationary point of the common price domain, while the optimal selling price is the upper limit. Whether the CM adopts a conservative or an aggressive production strategy depends on the threshold of the outsourcing price. Moreover, the coordination contract offers great flexibility in parameter selection. By setting the order quantity, penalty price and surplus purchase price properly, the supply chain can realize a win-win situation.
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