Online channel introduction under contract negotiation: Reselling versus agency selling

Chen, Chongping; Zhuo, Xiaopo; Li, Yanshan

doi:10.1002/mde.3364

Cited by 25 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…The spillover effect indicates how the spread of buying behaviors between online and offline channels significantly influences manufacturers’ expectations and decisions in choosing channels. Chen et al ( 2021 ) explored how a manufacturer’s bargaining power and the online spillover effect can positively or negatively influence the introduction of an online channel. They inferred that reselling will be unprofitable when the online spillover effect is significant, and the manufacturer has weak bargaining power.…”

Section: Systematic Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

E-commerce channel management on the manufacturers’ side: ongoing debates and future research pathways

et al. 2023

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Since the beginning of the 2000s, online commerce has been gradually taking over and shaping the global marketplace. This has led several scholars to study the phenomenon from different angles, from consumer habits to privacy risks to related technological innovations. However, only recently has a branch of literature addressing the online channel management phenomenon from the manufacturers’ perspective emerged. This rapidly expanding literature strand remains rather fragmented, raising the need for a systematic literature review to comprehensively structure and discuss it. This study, accordingly, proposes a systematic literature review on online channel management from the manufacturers’ perspective. Firstly, it provides relevant bibliometric insights into the ongoing research on the topic. Secondly, applying the bibliographic coupling methodology individuates 92 interconnected contributions published by 31 December 2021. Three different, albeit interconnected, thematic clusters are discovered and reviewed, revealing their focus on (a) strategic marketing issues around manufacturervsretailer conflict, (b) pricing policies and trade-offs among pricevsservices, and (c) operational interactions and strategies between supply chain members. Finally, after a systematic literature review the authors develop thirteen original research propositions concerning new research pathways and theoretical advancements to be designed and implemented.

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Section: Systematic Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

E-commerce channel management on the manufacturers’ side: ongoing debates and future research pathways

et al. 2023

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“…Their analysis demonstrated that in a dual-channel setting, the reselling model dominates when both customer channel preference and commission rate are relatively high, whereas the agency model dominates when the customer channel preference is relatively high (resp., low) and the commission rate is relatively small (resp., large). Chen et al (2021) showed that when the supplier introduces an online retailer channel in addition to an offline direct channel, it is always profitable to adopt the agency model, whereas the retailer always prefers the reselling model. Feng et al (2020) examined the impact of the rental online marketplace in the luxury fashion rental industry from both the supplier's and the platform's perspectives.…”

Section: Business Model Choicementioning

confidence: 99%

Reselling or agency model under markdown pricing policy in the presence of strategic customers

2022

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This paper establishes a game‐theoretic model to investigate the effect of strategic customers on the business model choice between the reselling and the agency models under a markdown pricing policy. We find that the supplier always prefers the agency model whereas the retailer's preference depends on the commission rate, the proportion of strategic customers, and the supplier's inventory level. Results also reveal that regardless of the business model, the proportion of strategic customers, the patience level of strategic customers, and the supplier's inventory level are three driving forces in the markdown pricing policy. Finally, different from the conventional wisdom that suggests the centralized decisions always outperform the decentralized decisions, we find that the decentralized decisions under the agency model can achieve the same performance as the centralized decisions when the supplier has a relatively small inventory level. Surprisingly, when the supplier has a relatively large inventory level, the agency model outperforms the centralized model since the former leads to lower prices and stimulates more demand.

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“…7 The OR purchases products from upstream suppliers with a wholesale price and sells via the EP with a retail price . The EP charges a platform usage fee rate from the OR (Chen et al, 2021 ; Wang et al, 2019 ). Therefore, the EP acts as an agency seller and his revenue comes from sharing the OR’s revenue.…”

Section: Model Formulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Financing the capital-constrained online retailer with risk aversion: coordinating strategy analysis

et al. 2022

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This paper considers a capital-constrained online retailer (OR) selling products through an e-commerce platform (EP) who also offers financial services to retailers. During the selling season, the OR exerts an effort to promote market demand through activities like sales promotions, advertising and live-streaming selling events. To investigate the EP-based financing scheme, a game-theoretic model is developed where the EP functions as the leader determining the interest rate and platform usage fee rate, and the OR functions as the follower determining the order quantity and effort level. We explore the impacts of the OR’s risk-aversion and find that when the OR is risk-averse (1) she sets a high effort level, and the EP sets a high usage fee rate; (2) a high risk-averse OR orders less products than low risk-averse OR. We design specific revenue-cost sharing contracts to coordinate the supply chain and demonstrate that the designed contracts are feasible. Moreover, we find that the OR consistently prefers EP financing compared to bank financing.

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Online channel introduction under contract negotiation: Reselling versus agency selling

Cited by 25 publications

References 32 publications

E-commerce channel management on the manufacturers’ side: ongoing debates and future research pathways

E-commerce channel management on the manufacturers’ side: ongoing debates and future research pathways

Reselling or agency model under markdown pricing policy in the presence of strategic customers

Financing the capital-constrained online retailer with risk aversion: coordinating strategy analysis

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