We expect firms with the greatest exposure to reputational damage among consumers will engage in lower levels of tax avoidance to minimize unwanted scrutiny that could impair the firms' reputation. We identify a set of firms with valuable consumer reputation using Harris Interactive's EquiTrend survey, which surveys consumers about their perceptions of valuable and prominent brands. We find evidence in support of our hypothesis that firms with valuable brands will engage in less tax avoidance. Specifically, we find a positive and significant association between our measure of reputation and both the GAAP and cash effective tax rates (measured over one and three years). We find mixed evidence on whether there is a negative and significant association between reputation and the probability the firm is engaging in tax sheltering.
While not explicitly stated, many tax avoidance studies seek to investigate tax avoidance that is the result of firms' deliberate actions. However, measures of firms' tax avoidance can also be affected by factors outside the firms' control—tax surprises. This study examines potential complications caused by tax surprises when measuring tax avoidance by focusing on one specific type of surprise tax savings—the unanticipated tax benefit from employees' exercise of stock options. Because the cash effective tax rate (ETR) includes the benefits of this tax surprise, the cash ETR mismeasures firms' deliberate tax avoidance. The analyses conducted show this mismeasurement is material and can lead to both Type I and Type II errors in studies of deliberate tax avoidance. Suggestions to aid researchers in mitigating these concerns are also provided.
Based on prospect theory's value function, we predict how reference points adapt to influence individuals' tax evasion choices during and after experiencing temporary tax changes. Results from a multi-round experiment indicate reactions to temporary changes depend jointly on the direction of the change and expectations. Specifically, individuals experiencing a tax increase evade more while the increase is in effect. More interestingly, knowing, versus not knowing, a tax decrease is temporary prevents an increase in evasion after the temporary change expires, and may lead individuals to reduce evasion during the change. In a supplemental condition, we induce uncertainty by repeatedly extending a tax decrease. We find when uncertainty is introduced, both benefits of knowing the temporal nature of the decrease are lost. Overall results are consistent with individuals failing to adapt to a loss state and adapting quickly to a gain state unless they are certain the gain state is temporary.
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