An important management question today is whether the anticipated economic benefits of Information Technology (IT) are being realized. In this paper, we consider this problem to be measurement related, and propose and test a new process-oriented methodology for ex post measurement to audit IT impacts on a strategic business unit (SBU) or profit center's performance. The IT impacts on a given SBU are measured relative to a group of SBUs in the industry. The methodology involves a two-stage analysis of intermediate and higher level output variables that also accounts for industry and economy wide exogenous variables for tracing and measuring IT contributions. The data for testing the proposed model were obtained from SBUs in the manufacturing sector. Our results show significant positive impacts of IT at the intermediate level. The theoretical contribution of the study is a methodology that attempts to circumvent some of the measurement problems in this domain. It also provides a practical management tool to address the question of why (or why not) certain IT impacts occur. Additionally, through its process orientation, the suggested approach highlights key variables that may require managerial attention and subsequent action.

This paper considers the question: How should a firm allocate a resource among divisions when the productivity of the resource in each division is known only to the division manager? Obviously if the divisions (as represented by their managers) are indifferent among various allocations of the resource, the headquarters can simply request the division managers to reveal their private information on productivity knowing that the managers have no incentive to lie. The resource allocation problem can then be solved under complete (or at least symmetric) information. This aspect is a flaw in much of the recent literature on this topic, i.e., there is nothing in the models considered which makes divisions prefer one allocation over another. Thus, although in some cases elaborate allocation schemes are proposed and analyzed, they are really unnecessary. In the model we develop, a division can produce the same output with less managerial effort if it is allocated more resources, and effort is costly to the manager. We further assume that this effort is unobservable by the headquarters, so that it cannot infer divisional productivity from data on divisional output and managerial effort. Given these assumptions, we seek an optimal resource allocation process. Our results show that certain types of transfer pricing schemes are optimal. In particular, if there are no potentially binding capacity constraints on production of the resource, then an optimal process is for each division to choose a transfer price from a schedule announced by the headquarters. Division managers receive a fixed compensation minus the cost of the resource allocated to them at the chosen transfer price. Resources are allocated on the basis of the chosen transfer prices. If there is a potentially binding constraint on resource production, a somewhat more complicated, but similar, scheme is required.organization design, asymmetric information, transfer pricing

We examine the relationship between life-cycle productivity and conformance quality in software products. The effects of product size, personnel capability, software process, usage of tools, and higher front-end investments on productivity and conformance quality were analyzed to derive managerial implications based on primary data collected on commercial software projects from a leading vendor. Our key findings are as follows. First, our results provide evidence for significant increases in life-cycle productivity from improved conformance quality in software products shipped to the customers. Given that the expenditure on computer software has been growing over the last few decades, empirical evidence for cost savings through quality improvement is a significant contribution to the literature. Second, our study identifies several quality drivers in software products. Our findings indicate that higher personnel capability, deployment of resources in initial stages of product development (especially design) and improvements in software development process factors are associated with higher quality products.software quality and life-cycle productivity, cost of quality, cmm, software process areas, front-end investments

We develop a model of network growth in the presence of network externalities for the case where a buyer initiates an interorganizational system with its suppliers. In our two-stage model, suppliers joining the network in the first stage can gain economic benefit from increased market share or higher price for the primary product. Suppliers encounter negative externalities since the economic benefit accruing to participating suppliers is less for increasingly larger networks. In the first stage, the buyer may experience initial supplier adoption of the network followed by a "stalling" problem due to negative externalities. In order to overcome this stalling problem, the buyer may find it optimal to subsidize some suppliers' costs to join the network in the second stage. We characterize the buyer's optimal second stage subsidy policy and show the conditions under which the buyer will find it optimal to offer a subsidy. If the suppliers have some positive ex ante expectation of a second stage subsidy, the growth of the network will be retarded in the first stage resulting in suboptimal profits for the buyer.telecommunications network, electronic data interchange, network externalities, monopsony, optimal subsidy policies

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Without exaggeration the basic challenge of management is economics: how to choose to employ scarce productive resources to accomplish limited objectives effectively.It is well recognized today, and increasingly so in post-industrial societies, that information, broadly defined, is a strategic economic resource that must be managed if it is to be productive.A comprehensive literature has developed .in the discipline of economics which concerns information, information systems and information-related phenomena of import to management and the development of management information systems (MIS). Although this literature is vast, this overview attempts to relate some of this work to MIS and MIS research. We highlight results in three general areas:1) those which concern the effect of information upon economic markets external to the firm; 2) those which concern issues of information and its relation to decision making and the internal organization of the firm; and 3) those which concern questions of allocation and control of information resources within the firm.In particular, attention will be directed to interpretation of the major results related to the effect of information upon markets and upon individual decision making, team theory, agency theory, decomposition theory, resource allocation and pricing, incentives, and information evaluation.

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