The Naming Game has proven to be an important model of opinion dynamics in complex networks. It is significantly enriched by the introduction of nodes committed to a single opinion. The resulting model is still simple but captures core concepts of opinion dynamics in networks. This model limitation is rigid commitment which never changes. Here we study the effect that making commitment variable has on the dynamics of the system. Committed nodes are assigned a commitment strength, w, defining their willingness to lose (in waning), gain (for increasing) or both (in variable) commitment to an opinion. Such model has committed nodes that can stick to a single opinion for some time without losing their flexibility to change it in the long run. The traditional Naming Game corresponds to setting w at infinity. A change in commitment strength impacts the critical fraction of population necessary for a minority consensus. Increasing w lowers critical fraction for waning commitment but increases this fraction for increasing commitment. Further, we show that if different nodes have different values of w, higher standard deviation of w increases the critical fraction for waning commitment and decrease this fraction for increasing commitment.

When opinions, behaviors or ideas diffuse within a population, some are invariably more sticky than others. The stickier the opinion, behavior or idea, the greater is an individual's inertia to replace it with an alternative. Here we study the effect of stickiness of opinions in a two-opinion model, where individuals change their opinion only after a certain number of consecutive encounters with the alternative opinion. Assuming that one opinion has a fixed stickiness, we investigate how the critical size of the competing opinion required to tip over the entire population varies as a function of the competing opinion's stickiness. We analyze this scenario for the case of a complete-graph topology through simulations, and through a semi-analytical approach which yields an upper bound for the critical minority size. We present analogous simulation results for the case of the Erdős-Rényi random network. Finally, we investigate the coarsening properties of sticky opinion spreading on two-dimensional lattices, and show that the presence of stickiness gives rise to an effective surface tension that causes the coarsening behavior to become curvature-driven.

Current models for opinion dynamics typically utilize a Poisson process for speaker selection, making the waiting time between events exponentially distributed. Human interaction tends to be bursty, though, having higher probabilities of either extremely short waiting times or long periods of silence. To quantify the burstiness effects on the dynamics of social models, we place in competition two groups exhibiting different speakers' waiting-time distributions. These competitions are implemented in the binary Naming Game, and show that the relevant aspect of the waitingtime distribution is the density of the head rather than that of the tail. We show that even with identical mean waiting times, a group with a higher density of short waiting times is favored in competition over the other group. This effect remains in the presence of nodes holding a single opinion that never changes, as the fraction of such committed individuals necessary for achieving consensus decreases dramatically when they have a higher head density than the holders of the competing opinion. Finally, to quantify differences in burstiness, we introduce the expected number of small-time activations and use it to characterize the early-time regime of the system.

Call Detail Record (CDR) datasets provide enough information about personal interactions of cell phone service customers to enable building detailed social networks. We take one such dataset and create a realistic social network to predict which customer will default on payments for the phone services, a complex behavior combining social, economic, and legal considerations. After extracting a large feature set from this network, we find that each feature poorly correlates with the default status. Hence, we develop a sophisticated model to enable reliable predictions. Our main contribution is a methodology for building complex behavior models from very large sets of diverse features and using different methods to choose those features that perform best for the final model. This approach enables us to identify the most efficient features for our problem which, unexpectedly, are based on the number of unique users with whom the given user communicates around the Christmas and New Year's Eve holidays. In general, features based on the number of close ties maintained by a user perform better than others. Our resulting models significantly outperform the methods * Corresponding author currently published in the literature. The paper contributes also a systematic analysis of properties of the network derived from CDR.

Pessimists about moral testimony hold that there is something suboptimal about forming moral beliefs by deferring to another. This paper motivates an analogous claim about self‐knowledge of the reason‐responsive attitudes. When it comes to your own mind, it seems important to know things “from the inside”, in the first‐personal way, rather than putting your trust in another. After motivating pessimism, the paper offers an explanation of its truth. First‐person knowledge is distinctive because it involves knowing a state of mind and finding it intelligible from one's point of view. It concludes by considering the value of this form of self‐understanding.