4Although plastic induces environmental damages, almost all water bottles are made from 5 plastic and the consumption never stops increasing. This study evaluates the consumers' 6 willingness to pay (WTP) for different plastics used for water packaging. Successive messages 7 emphasizing the characteristics of plastic are delivered to participants allowing explaining 8 the influence of information on the consumers' WTP. We find that information has a mani-9 fest effect on WTP. We show there is a significant premium associated with recycled plastic 10 packaging and organic and biodegradable plastic packaging. As there is no consensus on the 11 plastic which is the most or the least dangerous for the environment, we propose different 12 policies for protecting the environment. We discuss about the impact of these policies on

In France, home confinement is not a common preventive measure against an influenza pandemic, although it is used around the world. Based on a stated method approach, we analyze the attitude that the French would adopt if this measure were put in place. Next, we propose a cost-benefit analysis to discuss the cost-effectiveness of this measure. We find that over three-quarters of respondents report complying with home confinement. Their choice depends on their individual characteristics, the interaction they may have with an infected person and home confinement conditions, but not their experience with preventive measures. We find that behaviors such as sensitivity to certainty, selfishness and altruism emerge. As far as cost-effectiveness is concerned, our study shows that home confinement is a prevention path that should not be neglected and should even be prescribed.

In their efforts to affect regulations, firms have developed specific strategies to exploit scientific uncertainty. They have manufactured doubt by hiring and funding dissenting scientists, by producing and publicizing favorable scientific findings and by generally concealing their involvement in biased research. We propose a new model to study the interplay between scientific uncertainty, firms' miscommunication and public policies. The government is benevolent but populist, and maximizes social welfare as perceived by citizens. The industry can produce costly reports showing that its activity is not harmful. Citizens are unaware of the industry's miscommunication. We first characterize the industry's optimal miscommunication policy. The industry notably ceases miscommunicating abruptly when scientists' belief reaches a critical threshold. We identify a natural condition under which miscommunication is stronger under a tax on emissions than under command and control. We then analyze research funding. A populist government may support research to enable firms to falsely reassure citizens. Establishing an independent research agency helps limit the welfare losses induced by populist policies.

Despite the various measures taken to reduce air pollution in France, the French continue to use high-emission vehicles. We propose to evaluate the willingness to pay (WTP) for four means of transport: two high-emission vehicles (diesel taxi and diesel personal vehicle) and two low-emission vehicles (rented electric vehicle and public transport). Successive messages revealing the effects of air pollution on health and the environment are provided to individuals in a different order. The information conveyed changes both of the WTP of individuals and of their choices. However, the use of high-emission vehicles has not diminished, personal vehicles remain the most popular. Using data collected from our survey, a multinomial logit model is used to determine individual choices. We find that improving individuals' confidence in air pollution recommendations would be a good way to lead them to choose low-emission rather than high-emission means of transport. Moreover, these estimates also indicate that individuals who attach great importance to comfort are less likely to choose low-emission vehicles than those who value price above other factors. Individual interest can therefore prevail over collective interest, thus verifying the theory of the tragedy of the commons. Different policies (taxes, subsidies, or standard) to encourage people to adopt low-emission vehicles are then tested.

This is the "postprint" version, i.e. the authors' version that has been accepted for publication, of the article by De Gavelle et al., finally published in Climatic Change in 2020.

Recent environmental policies favour the polluter pays principle. This principle points out the pollutant financial liability for the eventual incidents induced by his activities. In this context, we analyse the decision of an agent to invest in new industrial activities, the consequences of which on human health and the environment are initially unknown. It is not possible for him to delay investing, but the agent has the opportunity to acquire information and to reduce the cost of an accident. This allows the agent to reduce uncertainty regarding dangers associated with the project and to limit potential damages that it might cause. However, the agent's chosen level of these actions may be considered as insufficient and not acceptable by Society as response in the face of a possible danger. Precautionary state regulation may then be introduced. We get that this regulation may slow down innovation and may favour innovation in countries with less safety requirements. We find that agent may get around the goal of the regulation by ignoring the information on the dangerousness of its project. We then propose some policy tools which stimulate innovation and impose a certain level of risk considered as acceptable for Society to the agent. Finally, we use a numerical analysis based on the Monsanto Company for studying the agent's behaviour with different regulatory frameworks.

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International audienceWe analyze production and investment decisions of an agent in industrial activities that are characterized by two forms of uncertainty: demand uncertainty (in terms of number of buyers) and competitive effect uncertainty (in terms of other energy resource). We apply our model on the bioenergy industries. We compare the case of an ambiguity neutral agent with that of an ambiguity averse agent. We show that the investment decision of an agent depends on the effects of both the capital investment and the level of production on the cost and the uncertainty the agent is confronted with. Moreover, we find that ambiguity aversion tends to decrease the agent's optimal levels of production and investment. Our numerical analysis of the French case illustrates the different effects associated with demand uncertainty and competitive effect uncertainty