Beginning with the economic crisis in 2008, a number of European societies witnessed the emergence of 'new parties'. Most authors explain their electoral appeal by focusing on how the perceived state of the economy influences individuals' voting decisions. This article determines the extent to which political attitudes can also explain voting for new political parties born in the heat of the economic crisis. Specifically, it explores the link between populist attitudes, in contrast to pluralist and elitist attitudes, and voting for two new political parties in Spain (Ciudadanos; Podemos), which are noticeably different in their ideological positions, programmatic proposals and populist discourses. The results show that stronger populist attitudes increase the likelihood of voting for new parties as dissimilar as Podemos and Ciudadanos. Overall, the findings suggest that voting for new parties cannot be understood as a mere economic response. Rather, political factors, and especially populist attitudes, matter too.

The populist radical-right label brings together parties characterised by their adherence to populism, nativism, and authoritarianism. While the relevance of the label to the family is unquestioned, its popularity, combined with the theoretical affinity between the three core elements, may cause radical-right parties to be systematically considered populist without further examination. This article posits that whether a radical-right party is populist is an open empirical question, and to demonstrate this, we test the importance of populism in the discourse and electoral success of a new radical-right party, Spain’s VOX. Our empirical strategy is based on the holistic grading of core political discourses, and the analysis of innovative survey data that includes populist attitudes and voting intention. Our results indicate that, despite the existence of certain populist elements in both the supply and demand sides of the electoral competition, these should be considered supplemental and subordinate to nationalist and traditionalist elements, which are central to explaining both the discourse and electoral success of VOX. We believe that our findings are a cautionary note against assuming that all radical-right parties are populist, and an invitation to improve empirical techniques able to separate populism, nativism, and authoritarianism in political discourses.

¿Puede un estudio de partidos populistas en el sur de Europa arrojar luz sobre la relación entre el populismo y el euroescepticismo? Este trabajo comparativo examina los diferentes grados y tipos de euroescepticismo de los partidos populistas en la región sur, ya que esperamos que la naturaleza más variada de los partidos populistas en esta región amplíe el conocimiento sobre las relaciones entre el populismo y el euroescepticismo. En general, nuestro artículo muestra que los partidos populistas de izquierda y derecha comparten lo que inicialmente puede parecer un perfil euroescéptico homogéneo. Sin embargo, un examen más exhaustivo confirma que los partidos populistas de izquierda tienen opiniones más positivas sobre el proceso de integración en los indicadores relacionados con el lado político de la UE (poderes del Parlamento Europeo y proceso de ampliación).

As the introduction to this special issue highlights, the Great Recession, along with the more recent phenomenon such as the refugees’ crisis and the Brexit referendum, has contributed to the success and strengthening of populist Eurosceptic parties across European party systems. The loss of legitimacy of governments and European institutions has opened a window of opportunity for parties expressing anti-establishment positions and populist orientations and criticizing the political-economic arrangements prevailing in Europe. Our study focuses on the rise of a specific left-wing populist Euroscepticism linked with the impact of the Great Recession and austerity measures in Portugal and Spain and the party system transformations. Thus, economic issues, bailouts, and, above all, anti-austerity measures were the main driving forces behind the transformations of Iberian party systems. The increase in populist reactions in both countries after the economic crisis and the implementation of austerity had to do with the transformation of the radical left emphasizing distributive issues in Eurosceptic populist directions. Finally, the analysis shows the distinctiveness of the populist Euroscepticism of the new challenger, Podemos, which illustrates the opportunities afforded with the economic crisis for the rise of new challenger parties exhibiting the contemporary link between populism and Euroscepticism in the radical left.

No abstract