This paper presents preliminary results of an analysis of trust in governmental institutions and social networks after the disaster of 11 March 2011, as well as an investigation of the implication of such trust resources for subjective well‐being. Using data from a postal survey carried out in the Tōhoku and Kanto region in September 2011, differences in trust resources are explored by regional proximity to the disaster area as well as by personal affliction. Levels of social trust prove to be generally high, whilst trust in governmental institutions is low, especially when personally affected by the disaster. Trust resources are shown to contribute positively to subjective well‐being and thus to constitute an important asset in the process of coping with disaster.

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We revisit a longstanding hypothesis that the public become more supportive of redistributive policy as income inequality rises. Previous tests of this hypothesis using various forms of general least squares regressions are inconclusive. We suggest improvements and alternatives to these tests. Using the World Inequality Data and International Social Survey Program we analyze 91 surveys in 18 countries. We incorporate three alternative measures of income inequality, including a measure of liberalization as a known cause of income inequality increases. We also employ two alternative test formats that arguably reflect the data generating model better than a least squares regression. The first is vector-autoregression aiming to account for path dependency of public opinion and income inequality, and the endogeneity between them. Next is qualitative comparative analysis to capture sets of conditions that collectively should have led to inequality having an impact on public opinion. Finally, we run our regression models separately for low and high socio-economic strata. In all tests we find no measurable impact of income inequality on support for redistribution. From a macro-perspective we argue that this suggests ruling out a general effect that exists across space and time, and focusing instead on theory to explain why there should not be a general effect. Some arguments suggest the public are normatively opposed to what sounds like 'handouts'. We therefore discuss model specification via theory, but also Type II errors, statistical power and the limitations of our conclusions.

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Does public opinion react to inequality, and if so, how? The social harms caused by increasing inequality should cause public opinion to ramp up demand for social welfare protections. However, the public may react to inequality differently depending on institutional context. Using ISSP and WID data (1980‒2006), we tested these claims. In liberal institutional contexts (mostly English‐speaking), increasing income inequality predicted higher support for state provision of social welfare. In coordinated and universalist contexts (mostly of Europe), increasing inequality predicted less support. Historically higher income concentration predicted less public support, providing an account of the large variation in inequality within the respective liberal and coordinated contexts. The results suggest opinions in liberal societies – especially with higher historical inequality – reached the limits of inequality, reacting negatively; whereas in coordinated/universalist societies – especially with lower historical inequality – opinions moved positively, as if desiring more inequality.

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Does public opinion react to inequality, and if so, how? The social harms caused by increasing inequality should cause public opinion to ramp up demand for social welfare protections.However, the public may react to inequality differently depending on institutional context. Using ISSP and WID data (1980-2006) we tested these claims. In liberal institutional contexts (mostly English-speaking), increasing income inequality predicted higher support for state provision of social welfare. In coordinated and universalist contexts (mostly of Europe), increasing inequality predicted less support. Historically higher income concentration predicted less public support, providing an account of the large variation in inequality within the respective liberal and coordinated contexts. The results suggest opinions in liberal societiesespecially with higher historical inequality -reached the limits of inequality, reacting negatively; whereas in coordinated/universalist societies -especially with lower historical inequality -opinions moved positively, as if desiring more inequality.

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