The limits of inequality: Public support for social policy across rich democracies

Abstract

Does public opinion react to inequality, and if so, how? The social harms caused by increasing inequality should cause public opinion to ramp up demand for social welfare protections. However, the public may react to inequality differently depending on institutional context. Using ISSP and WID data (1980‒2006), we tested these claims. In liberal institutional contexts (mostly English‐speaking), increasing income inequality predicted higher support for state provision of social welfare. In coordinated and universalist contexts (mostly of Europe), increasing inequality predicted less support. Historically higher income concentration predicted less public support, providing an account of the large variation in inequality within the respective liberal and coordinated contexts. The results suggest opinions in liberal societies – especially with higher historical inequality – reached the limits of inequality, reacting negatively; whereas in coordinated/universalist societies – especially with lower historical inequality – opinions moved positively, as if desiring more inequality.

No generalizable effect of income inequality on public support for governmental redistribution among rich democracies 1987–2010

“…Assuming the question does cognitively reflect its face value of asking about the government reducing incomes, we speculate why we do not find an effect. Other research suggests that support for social welfare policies increases in some contexts as a result of liberalization and increasing income inequality (Breznau and Hommerich 2019;Lupu and Pontusson 2011). However, as previous research on policy preferences suggests, support of the social welfare state and attitudes toward income redistribution are different attitude objects.…”

Untangling the tolerance of socioeconomic inequality: Comparing Japan, the United States, South Korea, and the People's Republic of China

“…The opposition to socioeconomic inequalities has not grown commensurately with their continued rise (Breznau & Hommerich, 2019; Dallinger, 2010; Kenworthy & McCall, 2008; Larsen, 2016). Therefore, the central aim of this paper has been twofold: first, to elaborate on some of the possible reasons behind the tolerance of existing socioeconomic inequality; second, to explore how this compares across four very distinctive political and socioeconomic regimes—Japan, the United States, South Korea, and the PRC—over a 26‐year time period, from 1994 to 2020.…”

“…The gap in privilege between groups has been widening steadily and has resulted in substantial cross‐national and historical variation in wealth and income inequality across post‐industrial countries (e.g., Brady, 2009; Milanovic, 2016; Nolan et al, 2014; Piketty, 2014). This, however, has not led to a substantial societal backlash, growth of public discontent, or social mobilization (Breznau & Hommerich, 2019; Dallinger, 2010; Larsen, 2016; McCall & Kenworthy, 2009). Nor has increasing socioeconomic inequality been identified as the new social problem in mass media, either.…”

“…Overall, the research on attitudes towards inequality and redistribution over the last decade has shown that citizens do not necessarily react directly to the actual levels of inequality (Dallinger, 2010). Furthermore, the research shows that the growing liberalization and marketization of societies and the political discourse since the 1980s have actually made individuals more accepting of a variety of socioeconomic inequalities (Breznau & Hommerich, 2019; Dallinger, 2010; Kenworthy & McCall, 2008; Starmans et al, 2017). This prompts questions about what motivates societies to tolerate socioeconomic inequality, how the tolerance of socioeconomic inequality has changed over the last quarter of the century, and how this compares across very different political and socioeconomic regimes.…”

The Two Faces of Support for Redistribution in Colombia: Taxing the Wealthy or Assisting People in Need

“…Additionally, the vast majority of research about support for redistribution comes from Europe and the United States (e.g., Mccall and Orloff, 2017 ; Van Heuvelen, 2017 ; Breznau and Hommerich, 2019a ), which overlooks some regions from the Global South. Although some international surveys account for countries from different regions of the world (i.e., World Values Survey), there is little development on explaining people's support for redistribution in non-European and non-Anglo-Saxon countries.…”