In this work we analyze four techniques to protect a cryptographic core, which can be combined to allow for several implementations with different area overheads and protection levels. Experimental results show their efficiency in protecting the core against fault attacks, while being flexible enough to leave other design aspects to be explored by the core provider.
This work describes a hardware approach for the concurrent fault detection and error correction in a cryptography core. It has been shown in the literature that transient faults injected in a cryptography core can lead to reveal the encryption code using quite inexpensive equipments. This kind of attack is a real threat to tamper resistant devices such as Smart Cards. To tackle such attacks, the cryptography core must be immune to transient faults. In this work the DES algorithm is taken as a vulnerable cryptosystem case study. We show how an attack against DES is performed through a fault injection campaign. Then, a countermeasure based on partial hardware replication is proposed and applied to DES. Experimental results show the efficiency of the proposed scheme to protect DES against DFA fault attacks. Furthermore, the proposed solution is independent of implementation and can be applied to other cryptography algorithms, such as AES.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.