Levels of subnational democracy vary significantly within countries around the world. Drawing on fiscal theories of the state, the author argues that this variance is often explained by a type of rentierism that is not geographically determined by natural resources but politically created by certain fiscal federalism arrangements. He posits that less democratic regimes are more likely in rentier provinces—those that receive disproportionately large central government transfers and practically forgo local taxation. Intergovernmental revenue-sharing rules that produce large vertical fiscal imbalances and favor the economically smaller districts provide their incumbents with generous “fiscal federalism rents” that allow them to restrict democratic contestation and weaken checks and balances. Statistical evidence from a panel data set of the Argentine provinces strongly confirms this expectation, even after controlling for standard alternative explanations such as level of development. Sensitivity analysis shows that this finding is extremely robust to alternative panel estimators. Qualitative and quantitative evidence suggests that the effect of heavy public spending on the economic autonomy of political actors is the main causal mechanism at work.

We analyze the remarkable differences in the electoral success of new parties and compare the determinants of electoral volatility attributable to new versus established parties. We base our findings on an original data set of total volatility, extra-system volatility, and within-system volatility for 67 democratic countries across all regions of the world since 1945. The article makes three contributions. First, we show that it is important to distinguish between electoral volatility that represents vote shifts among established parties (within-system volatility) and shifts to new parties (extra-system volatility). Second, we provide descriptive information about total, within-system, and extra-system volatility for 67 countries. Third, we analyze the determinants of volatility. Our results show that the causes of within- and extra-system volatility differ markedly. In contrast to Powell and Tucker, for our broader range of countries and longer time period, there are several statistically robust positive findings.

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This article explains the unanticipated emergence of party-oriented legislators and rising party discipline in Brazil since the early 1990s. The authors contend that deputies in Brazil became increasingly party oriented because the utilities of party-programmatic and patronage-based electoral strategies shifted with market reforms that created a programmatic cleavage in Brazilian politics and diminished the resource base for state patronage. The study introduces new measures of partisan campaigns, party polarization, and values that legislators attached to party programs and voter loyalty based on an original survey of the Brazilian Congress. Regression analysis confirms that deputies who believe that voters value party programs have run partisan, programmatic campaigns, and those in polarized parties and those who believe voters are loyal to the party are willing to delegate authority to party leaders and do not switch parties. Party polarization and the proximity of deputies' policy preferences to their party's mean explain discipline on 236 roll-call votes in the 51st legislature (1999-2001).

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