Measuring Variance in Subnational Regimes: Results from an Expert-Based Operationalization of Democracy in the Argentine Provinces

Abstract

is an Open Access publication. It may be read, copied and distributed free of charge according to the conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.

How Investor Portfolios Shape Regulatory Outcomes: Privatized Infrastructure After Crises

“…We also coded an annual variable indicating whether or not the lead investor was publicly listed, and we extended Gervasoni's dataset on gubernatorial alignment with the Argentine national executive to control for the effect of partisanship and access to federal funds (Gervasoni, 2010). Sources for all variables, as well as descriptive statistics, are presented in Table 5 (Appendix A).…”

Politics in Space

“…In light of a wealth of empirical evidence demonstrating territorial unevenness in democratization (e.g., Lankina & Getachew, 2006;Gervasoni, 2010;Giraudy, 2010;Schedler, 2014), however, the idea that we cannot meaningfully study intracountry variation in democracy is clearly unsatisfactory. Scholarship has therefore consciously discussed conditions under which concepts originally developed for the national arena can be applied to subnational units and whether acknowledging the presence of multiple levels of analysis (and power) creates the need to refine concepts, also at the national level (e.g., Harbers & Ingram, 2014).…”

“…All dimensions contain an explicit reference to institutional categories, thus implying that democracy varies at the level of that particular institutional framework. An important implication of this conceptual choice is that only federal or politically decentralized countries display subnational variation in democracy (see also Lankina & Getachew, 2006;Gervasoni, 2010;Behrend, 2011).…”

Home Court Advantage

“…To measure the extent to which governors in the postcrisis period would fall into Murillo's "populist" or statist category, I turned to expert survey data compiled by Gervasoni in each of the Argentine provinces regarding governors' alignment with President Néstor Kirchner, who presided over a few high-profile nationalizations. 69 Domestic investors, and particularly those with diverse local holdings, concluded negotiations at far higher rates than foreign firms even in provinces governed by aligned governors between 2004 and 2007 (the period covered by Gervasoni's data). 70 Furthermore, foreign firms exited their contracts at much higher rates than domestic investors with and without diverse local holdings in provinces governed by both aligned and nonaligned governors.…”