No abstract

Extreme space weather due to coronal mass ejections has the potential to cause considerable disruption to the global economy by damaging the transformers required to operate electricity transmission infrastructure. However, expert opinion is split between the potential outcome being one of a temporary regional blackout and of a more prolonged event. The temporary blackout scenario proposed by some is expected to last the length of the disturbance, with normal operations resuming after a couple of days. On the other hand, others have predicted widespread equipment damage with blackout scenarios lasting months. In this paper we explore the potential costs associated with failure in the electricity transmission infrastructure in the U.S. due to extreme space weather, focusing on daily economic loss. This provides insight into the direct and indirect economic consequences of how an extreme space weather event may affect domestic production, as well as other nations, via supply chain linkages. By exploring the sensitivity of the blackout zone, we show that on average the direct economic cost incurred from disruption to electricity represents only 49% of the total potential macroeconomic cost. Therefore, if indirect supply chain costs are not considered when undertaking cost‐benefit analysis of space weather forecasting and mitigation investment, the total potential macroeconomic cost is not correctly represented. The paper contributes to our understanding of the economic impact of space weather, as well as making a number of key methodological contributions relevant for future work. Further economic impact assessment of this threat must consider multiday, multiregional events.

Space weather phenomena have been studied in detail in the peer‐reviewed scientific literature. However, there has arguably been scant analysis of the potential socioeconomic impacts of space weather, despite a growing gray literature from different national studies, of varying degrees of methodological rigor. In this analysis, we therefore provide a general framework for assessing the potential socioeconomic impacts of critical infrastructure failure resulting from geomagnetic disturbances, applying it to the British high‐voltage electricity transmission network. Socioeconomic analysis of this threat has hitherto failed to address the general geophysical risk, asset vulnerability, and the network structure of critical infrastructure systems. We overcome this by using a three‐part method that includes (i) estimating the probability of intense magnetospheric substorms, (ii) exploring the vulnerability of electricity transmission assets to geomagnetically induced currents, and (iii) testing the socioeconomic impacts under different levels of space weather forecasting. This has required a multidisciplinary approach, providing a step toward the standardization of space weather risk assessment. We find that for a Carrington‐sized 1‐in‐100‐year event with no space weather forecasting capability, the gross domestic product loss to the United Kingdom could be as high as £15.9 billion, with this figure dropping to £2.9 billion based on current forecasting capability. However, with existing satellites nearing the end of their life, current forecasting capability will decrease in coming years. Therefore, if no further investment takes place, critical infrastructure will become more vulnerable to space weather. Additional investment could provide enhanced forecasting, reducing the economic loss for a Carrington‐sized 1‐in‐100‐year event to £0.9 billion.

Geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) are driven by the geoelectric field induced by fluctuations of Earth's magnetic field. Drivers of intense GICs are often associated with large impulsive events such as coronal mass ejections. To a lesser extent fluctuations from regular oscillations of the geomagnetic field, or geomagnetic pulsations, have also been identified as possible drivers of GICs. In this work we show that these low‐frequency pulsations are directly observed in measured GIC data from power networks. Due to the low‐pass nature of GICs, Pc5 and lower‐frequency pulsations drive significant GICs for an extended duration even at midlatitudes. Longer‐period Ps6‐type disturbances apparently not typical of midlatitudes are seen with GIC amplitudes comparable to the peak GIC at storm sudden commencement. The quasi‐ac (alternating current) nature of the sustained pulsation driving affects the power system response and cannot be properly modeled using only direct current (dc) models. A further consideration is that the often used dB/dt GIC proxy is biased to the sampling rate of the geomagnetic field measurements used. The dB/dt metric does not adequately characterize GIC activity at frequencies in the low ultralow‐frequency (ULF) range, and a frequency‐weighted proxy akin to geoelectric field should be used instead.

Power grids and pipeline networks at all latitudes are known to be at risk from the natural hazard of geomagnetically induced currents. At a recent workshop in South Africa, UK and South African scientists and engineers discussed the current understanding of this hazard, as it affects major power systems in Europe and Africa. They also summarised, to better inform the public and industry, what can be said with some certainty about the hazard and what research is yet required to develop useful tools for geomagnetic hazard mitigation.