Although engaging in task-unrelated thoughts can be enjoyable and functional under certain circumstances, allowing one's mind to wander off-task will come at a cost to performance in many situations. Given that task-unrelated thoughts need to be blocked out when the current task requires full attention, it has been argued that cognitive control is necessary to prevent mind-wandering from becoming maladaptive. Extending this idea, we exposed participants to tasks of different demands and assessed mind-wandering via thought probes. Employing a latent-change model, we found mind-wandering to be adjusted to current task demands. As hypothesized, the degree of adjustment was predicted by working memory capacity, indicating that participants with higher working memory capacity were more flexible in their coordination of on- and off-task thoughts. Notably, the better the adjustment, the smaller performance decrements due to increased task demands were. On the basis of these findings, we argue that cognitive control does not simply allow blocking out task-unrelated thoughts but, rather, allows one to flexibly adjust mind-wandering to situational demands.

Holding an intention often interferes with other ongoing activities, indicating that resource-demanding processes are involved in maintaining the intention and noticing the appropriate event to fulfill it. Little is known, however, about the nature of the processes underlying this task interference effect. The goal of the present research was to decompose the processes contributing to the task interference effect by applying the diffusion model (Ratcliff, Psychological Review 85:59-108, 1978) to an event-based prospective memory task. In the first experiment, we validated the interpretation of the response criterion parameter (a) of the diffusion model as reflecting strategies to cope with the anticipated demands of a prospective memory task in the context of the ongoing task. The second experiment served to investigate which underlying processes contribute to the task interference often found with prospective memory tasks. Diffusion model analyses revealed that the task interference effect was due to (1) less efficient processing in the more demanding than in the less demanding prospective memory task and (2) a more conservative response criterion. We suggest that the anticipated demands and the additional processing demands of the prospective memory task jointly contribute to the task interference effect.

Younger adults' "remember" judgments are accompanied by better memory for the source of an item than "know" judgments. Furthermore, remember judgments are not merely associated with better memory for individual source features but also with bound memory for multiple source features. However, older adults, independent of their subjective memory experience, are generally less likely to "bind" source features to an item and to each other in memory (i.e., the associative deficit). In two experiments, we tested whether memory for perceptual source features, independently or bound, is also the basis for older adults' remember responses or if their associative deficit leads them to base their responses on other types of information. The results suggest that retrieval of perceptual source features, individually or bound, forms the basis for younger but not for older adults' remember judgments even when the overall level of memory for perceptual sources is closely equated (Experiment 1) and when attention is explicitly directed to the source information at encoding (Experiment 2).

There is converging evidence that the feeling of conscious recollection is usually accompanied by the bound retrieval of context features of the encoding episode (e.g., Meiser, Sattler, & Weiβer, 2008). Recently, however, important limiting conditions have been identified for the binding between context features in memory. For example, focusing on the semantics of the stimuli during encoding eliminates binding between perceptual context features (Meiser & Sattler, 2007). In the present research, we investigated the interplay of the focus of attention during encoding and stimulus characteristics in context-context binding. In particular, it has been suggested that context features differ in the degree to which they can be regarded as intrinsic or extrinsic to the items and that intrinsic features might be given more attentional processing during encoding than extrinsic features (e.g., Ecker, Zimmer, & Groh-Bordin, 2007a). In two experiments, we manipulated the "intrinsicality" of context features to investigate whether context-context binding might be limited to features that are in the focus of processing. Multinomial modeling analyses revealed that while context-context binding was eliminated for incidentally processed extrinsic context features (Experiment 1), it was preserved for intentionally processed extrinsic context features (Experiment 2).

In the present research, we tested the predictions of different accounts of context binding in "remember" judgements. Context binding, defined as the stochastically dependent retrieval of two different context features, has previously been suggested to be due to mechanisms operating at retrieval either by cueing among context features (Meiser & Bröder, 2002) or by cueing between item and context features (Starns & Hicks, 2008). These accounts, however, do not make specific assumptions regarding the underlying memory representation supporting context binding. By contrast, here we propose that a binding process at encoding integrates item and context information into a coherent memory representation. Varying the presentation of the context features during encoding either with both context features presented simultaneously or with features spread over two encoding episodes, data from two experiments corroborate the notion that binding is produced at encoding. This result suggests that a binding process integrating the context features at encoding is necessary for stochastically dependent retrieval of context features.