Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the importance of market imperfection, namely, variation in managerial ability (MA), on dividend policy in China. The authors focus on the Chinese market as it is dominated by state-owned enterprises and test whether the association between MA and dividend policy varies systematically with the degree of state ownership. Design/methodology/approach To measure MA, this study exploits a novel measure developed by Demerjian et al. (2012) to estimate how efficiently manager utilizes firm’s resources. Manager efficiency is defined in terms of output a manager produces based on inputs available within firm. Findings The authors find that relationship between MA and dividend policy is primarily driven by non-state own enterprises compare to state own enterprises, more prevalent for financially unconstrained firms with strong balance sheet and more pronounced under high marketized groups as compare to low marketized groups. These finding are robust under battery of robustness checks. This research adds new insight for the policy makers and investors to pay more attention on MA. Practical implications This research adds new insight for the policy makers and investors to pay more attention on MA. Originality/value This study augments the dividend policy literature by relaxing perfect capital market assumption of Miller and Modigliani, and neo-classic view of firms by incorporating a new novel factor – variation in MA – and applies it to the emerging market of China.

Purpose Numerous researchers have developed theories and studies to uncover the issues pertinent to dividend policy dynamics, but it is still one of the unresolved problems of finance. The purpose of this paper is to focus on a new dimension, i.e., financial expertise on the corporate board for explaining the dividend policy dynamics in the emerging equity markets of China and Pakistan. Design/methodology/approach The study employs static (fixed effect (FE) and random effect (RE)) and dynamic models – two-step generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation techniques by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) – during the timespan from 2009 to 2014. Further, this study re-estimated FE, RE and GMM two-step estimation techniques by excluding the non-dividend-paying companies, and also employed instrumental variable regressing by using two instrumental variables – industry average financial expertise of the board and board size – as proxies for board financial expertise to control the possible endogeneity. Findings The study reveals that Chinese firms having more financial expertise on the board do not take dividends as a control mechanism (substitution hypothesis), while Pakistani firms support the compliment hypothesis and use dividends as a control mechanism to mitigate agency conflict to protect shareholders’ interests and keep additional funds from the manager’s opportunism. Further robustness models also confirm the presence of a significant association between dividend policy and board financial expertise in both equity markets. Originality/value This study introduces the financial expertise on a board as a determinant of dividend policy. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, no previous studies have focused on board-level financial expertise as a contributing factor toward dividend policy.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate the impact of board financial expertise on the shareholding of foreign institutional investors in an emerging equity market of China and to explore whether ownership concentration moderates the relationship between board financial expertise and foreign institutional investment. Design/methodology/approach To test the hypothesized relationships, this study uses panel data regression models, i.e. static (fixed effect and random effect) and dynamic (two-step generalized methods of moments) models. Further, to control the possible endogeniety issue, this study uses two instrumental variables, namely, board size and industry average financial expertise of board to proxy board financial expertise. This study covers a period from 2006 to 2015 for 169 listed Chinese firms. Findings The results revealed that foreign institutional investors positively perceived board financial expertise and holds more shareholdings with the increasing level of financial experts at boards of directors. Moreover, ownership concentration positively moderated this relationship. It means that in highly concentrated firms, the board financial expertise conveys a stronger signal to foreign institutional investors that firms can manage financial resources rationally by controlling negative effects of ownership concentration. Further, the robustness model also confirmed the relationship between board financial expertise and foreign institutional shareholdings. Originality/value To the best of authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to investigate board-level financial expertise as a determinant of foreign institutional ownership. Further, no previous study has used ownership concentration as a contextual variable on the relationship between board financial expertise and foreign institutional investment.

Policymakers/researchers have developed a lot of theories and empirics to study issues related to investment policy. The current study investigcates in detail the managerial role in a firm's investment decision. This study is evident that the relationship is more profound for the firms that are large and financially unconstrained and have a strong balance sheet position. For economic constraints, the effect for SO firms is more pertinent than non‐state‐owned (NSO) firms, and the negative effect of competition and recession is decreased by high ability managers. For mitigating the effect of endogeneity and getting robust results, a propensity score matching approach is to be used.

We examine the influence of Economic Policy Uncertainty (E.P.U.) on dividend sustainabilitydividend termination and dividend initiation decision. Using a sample of 1,375 firms over the time span 2000-2015, our main result reveals that during high E.P.U. past dividend payers are more likely to terminate and past nonpayers are less likely to initiate dividends. However, firms that rely more on internal finance (I.F.), generate high return on invested capital (R.O.I.C.) and state-owned enterprises (S.O.E.s) are less exposed to E.P.U. Therefore, negative (positive) effect of E.P.U. on firms' dividend initiation (termination) decision is mitigated by considering firms' heterogeneous characteristics. Results also show that firms having high asset growth, maturity, profitability, cash holdings and high firm value are more likely to initiate and less likely to terminate dividend during period of high E.P.U. In addition, effects of E.P.U. on dividend sustainability is higher for firms functioning in high marketised areas relative to low marketised groups. These findings are robust under different robustness check. Finding confirms that transparent and stable implementation of economic policies can improve sustainability of firm's dividend policy.

Increased competition in the world of emerging financial markets has highlighted the need for more strategic and far‐sighted decisions. Living in a constrained economy investor has always been sensitive about the dividend patterns offered by the firm. Current study focuses on the moderating role of board financial expertise (BFE) on dividend decision of the firm during economic policy uncertainty (EPU), by taking data for 517 nonfinancial listed firms from year 2007–2015. Study presents its empirical model in two forms based on dividend initiation (Di) by nondividend payer firms and dividend termination (Dt) by already dividend paying firms during EPU. Logit model was employed to access the effect of explanatory variables on the probability of terminating the dividend by dividend payers and probability of initiating the dividend by nondividend payers during EPU. The results indicate that firms terminate dividend at the time of uncertainty, but when BFE was introduced as a moderator, previously nonpayer firms initiate dividend and previously payer firms sustain dividends payments at the time of EPU that remains robust with the inclusion of additional CEO level and corporate governance variables. Study further confirms during the EPU, dividend decisions in turn significantly affect firm value as supported by expectancy theory. Results suggest that BFE can be an important signal for keen market participants in deciding future dimensions of a firm.

This study contributes to the literature by exploring the relationship between board financial expertise and cash holding policy and further showing how this relation is moderated by multiple large shareholders (MLS). This research is based on agency theory, resource dependence, trade-off, and pecking order theory to confirm how resourceful directors screen cash holding practices. This study selects the 100 listed family firms from the emerging economy of Pakistan for the period of 2006–2017. With the use of static (random and fixed effect estimator) and dynamic (GMM) estimation techniques, this study reveals that the financial expertise of the board members has a significant negative impact on the firms’ cash holding level. Further, moderating effect of MLS between board financial expertise and cash holding is significantly positive due to weak corporate governance mechanisms in family firms. Moreover, the research has implications for developing corporate governance mechanism and the management of liquid assets that corporate management might use for their benefits.

Purpose Many scholars have developed several theories and empirics to study issues related to investment policy. However, there are still some unexplored issues in the field of finance that require further analysis and investigation, particularly in the corporate governance literature such as the role of managerial talent in the firms. This study investigated the impact of managerial ability on investment decisions of the firms. Design/methodology/approach The study first uses firm efficiency and managerial ability by using data envelope analysis (DEA) proposed by Demerjian, Lev and McVay, 2012. Data is collected for the firms listed in Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchange for an emerging market of China during the crisis period with 1,640 number of observations. Findings The study reveals that the presence of more managerial talent in a firm is significant for the strategic decisions of the firms. Findings follow a resource-based view and identify that more talented managers help the firms in the acquisition of resources specifically during financial distress. The study subdivides the firms based on: ownership structures and financial constraints. Results generated from propensity score matching imply that the role of high-talented managers is significantly different from that of low-talented managers. Originality/value The study reveals managerial ability as a determinant of investment policy. To the researchers’ best knowledge, none of the previous studies have been conducted in emerging market literature during the crisis period.