No abstract

Over the last two decades, the number of honey bee colonies performing pollination services for the California almond industry has grown steadily and now equals a substantial share of all colonies in the U.S. Most U.S. beekeeping operations have not expanded their colony numbers at the current levels of almond pollination fees. Thus, as almond acreage has increased, the marginal supplier of colonies has moved further away from California, increasing interstate shipments. We provide a conceptual representation of the supply and demand of U.S. colonies for almond pollination, and utilize the relatively inelastic demand for colonies to explore spatial elasticities of supply. We analyze temporal and spatial characteristics of the supply of colonies for almond pollination using colony shipment data from 2007 through 2018 provided by the California Department of Food and Agriculture. We use a geographically weighted regression to calculate supply elasticities for each state during this time period by combining the shipment data with prices from the California State Beekeeper's Association pollination fee survey. Florida and Texas, where beekeepers have hesitated to participate in almond pollination due to relatively high transportation costs and the potential for local honey production at the time of almond bloom, have some of the highest price elasticities of supply. This suggests that beekeepers in areas with low transportation and/or opportunity costs have supplied all available colonies, and increases in almond pollination fees have had little effect. We estimate that Florida, Georgia and Texas had the largest number of colonies which did not participate in almond pollination in 2017, so further increases in supply are likely to come from these states.

Using a novel policyholder-level data set, we analyse participants’ choices of 2-month index intervals in the Rainfall Index for Pasture, Rangeland and Forage (RI-PRF) insurance programme. We first provide a conceptual model that illustrates participation patterns of the rainfall index insurance. We then connect these predicted patterns to some empirical evidence from the policyholder-level data set, which is a subset of data provided by the USDA Risk Management Agency for all RI-PRF participants in Nebraska and Kansas during the years 2013–2017. Because the correlations between forage yield and precipitation and the expected premium subsidy vary by month, different degrees of risk aversion may predict distinctively different choices of the 2-month intervals. Using cluster analysis, we group the participants with similar allocation patterns across the 2-month intervals. We observe that the number of participants displaying relatively low levels of risk aversion increase over time. We connect this to the fact that premium subsidies and producer returns associated with non-growing season (risk-increasing) months are often greater than those for growing season (risk-reducing) months, and this has important implications for policy design. Our findings suggest that more research in this area could assist policymakers in keeping the RI-PRF programme in line with its objective of reducing risk for livestock producers.

Goodrich (UC Davis) Are All Colonies Created Equal? 1 / 21 Motivation Background Theory Empirical Analysis Conclusions Economics of Pollination: Reciprocal Benefits Meade (1952): Hive placed near apple orchard Apple grower receives pollination services (input to apples) Beekeeper receives nectar (input to honey) Colonies exhibit increasing returns to scale in pollination services and honey production (Sagili et al., 2011) Most commercially-pollinated crops Grower and beekeeper benefit from hives with large bee populations Grower View Beekeeper View Goodrich (UC Davis) Are All Colonies Created Equal? 2 / 21 Motivation Background Theory Empirical Analysis Conclusions

Declining survey response rates have driven many researchers to seek out cost-effective methods of increasing participation, such as conducting surveys online, paying incentives, and using social media to engage hard-to-reach populations. Malicious actors can exploit the monetary incentives and anonymity of online surveys, threatening the integrity of survey data.We share two recent experiences conducting online surveys that were inundated with fraudulent responses. Our objective is to increase awareness of this emerging issue and offer guidance for others to mitigate the effects of fraudulent responders in their own research.

Through a framed field experiment with livestock farmers in the Northeast and Southeast United States, this research explores whether an informational nudge changes producers' selection of two‐month intervals and/or increases the likelihood of enrollment in pasture, rangeland, and forage (PRF) insurance. We find no evidence that a nudge influences interval choices; however, producers are more likely to enroll when PRF is framed as a risk management decision regarding forage loss. Risk aversion, familiarity with other United States Department of Agriculture livestock programs, and higher risk exposure increase the likelihood of enrollment. Past PRF and crop insurance participation decrease the amount insured during growing‐season months.

California almond orchards are most U.S. beekeepers' first stop on their pollination and honey production circuit, so the agrochemicals bees are exposed to in almonds can shape the vitality of their colony for the rest of the year. We explored the potential for honey bee exposure to bee-toxic agrochemicals during almond bloom by utilizing the California Department of Pesticide Regulations' Pesticide Use Report database from 1990 to 2016. We found that overall, growers are observing the pesticide labels and reducing their use of labeled bee-toxic pesticides during almond bloom. However, we also found that insect growth regulators, fungicides and organosilicone surfactants — agrochemicals often not labeled as toxic to bees — are commonly applied during almond bloom. These agrochemicals can be sublethally or synergistically toxic to adult honey bees and bee larvae, presenting potential harm to colonies during almond pollination. Our findings demonstrate the need for a shift in the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's labeling requirements, as well as continued communication between almond growers, pesticide applicators and beekeepers to keep colonies at a low risk of bee-toxic agrochemical exposure.

Government-supported farm programs can provide farm operators with different economic incentives regarding the use of their land. We study two US farm programs relevant to hay and pastureland, the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and Pasture, Rangeland, and Forage (PRF) Index Insurance. Using county-level enrollment and availability data, we find that the introduction of PRF reduces enrollment in CRP. This interaction potentially returns environmentally sensitive farmland back into production. We also document the heterogeneity of the effects over time and the dynamic effects across the length of exposure.