Abstract:In the absence of effective world-wide cooperation to curb global warming, import tariffs on embodied carbon have been proposed as a potential supplement to unilateral emissions pricing. We systematically consider alternative designs for such tariffs, and analyze their effects on global welfare within a multi-region, multi-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of global trade and energy. Our analysis shows that systems more likely to comply with international law yield very little in terms of carbon leakage and efficiency. Generally, the effectiveness increases substantially with complexity. However, regionalising the tariffs seems not to be worthwhile. Also, the most effective system we identify is not based on fully input-output-corrected carbon contents, but on direct plus electricity emissions, only. This reflects the more general problem of finding systems that are both feasible and well-targeted in a real global economy.

Abstract:Indirect taxes such as value added taxes (VAT) generate a substantial part of tax revenue in many countries. This paper analyses welfare effects of different reforms in the Norwegian system of indirect taxation. The main reform studied is the introduction of a uniform VAT rate on all goods and services. The Norwegian political VAT reform of 2001 is also analysed. The reforms are analysed by using an intertemporal CGE model for the Norwegian economy. A non-uniform VAT system gives a welfare loss compared to a uniform VAT system.

Using a rich Norwegian panel dataset that includes information about the type and number of patent applications, direct environmental regulations, and a large number of control variables, we analyze the effects of direct regulations on environmental patenting. We use inspection violation status as a measure of regulatory stringency, while controlling for risk class. Violation status captures the probability that a firm might be sanctioned for violating its emission permit. Controlling for risk class captures firm heterogeneity related to dirtiness and inspection frequency. We empirically identify strong and significant effects on innovations resulting from the implicit regulatory costs of direct regulations.

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Welfare and growth impacts of innovation policies in a small, open economyAn applied general equilibrium analysis Abstract:We explore how innovation incentives in a small, open economy should be designed in order to achieve the highest welfare and growth, by means of a computable general equilibrium model with R&D-driven endogenous technological change embodied in varieties of capital. We study policy alternatives targeted towards R&D, capital varieties formation, and domestic investments in capital varieties. Subsidising domestic investments, thereby excluding stimuli to world market deliveries, generates less R&D, capital formation, economic growth, and welfare, than do the other alternatives, reflecting that the domestic market for capital varieties is limited. Directing support to R&D rather than to capital formation generates stronger economic growth, a higher number of patents and capital varieties, and a higher share of R&D in total production. However, it costs in terms of lower production within each firm, where presence of sunk patent costs and mark-ups result in efficiency losses. The welfare result is, thus, slightly lower.