Alternative designs for tariffs on embodied carbon: A global cost-effectiveness analysis

Böhringer, Christoph; Bye, Brita; Fæhn, Taran; Rosendahl, Knut Einar

doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2012.08.020

Cited by 68 publications

(35 citation statements)

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“…When comes to criteria (i) previous studies have discussed how to practically delimit the emission embodiment in the tariff calculations; see, e.g., Böhringer et al (2012b). Total embodied carbon can be decomposed into three components; a) the carbon emissions directly originating from the production process of a good, b) indirect emissions involved in generating the electricity that is used in the production of the good and c) all other indirect carbon emissions caused when producing all the inputs in the production of the good.…”

Section: Feasibility Aspects Of Targeted Carbon Tariffsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Many studies include indirect emissions in the the tariff calculations. Only rarely are all embodied emissions accounted for (e.g., Böhringer et al, 2012b), but rather often are the emissions arising from the use of electricity accounted for (e.g. Mattoo et al 2009, Winchester 2011, Böhringer et al 2012a).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Böhringer et al (2012b) discuss these issues in more detail. The main legal challenge is to comply with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) law.…”

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Targeted Carbon Tariffs - Carbon Leakage and Welfare Effects

et al. 2015

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Abstract:Climate effects of unilateral carbon policies are undermined by carbon leakage. To counteract leakage and increase global cost-effectiveness carbon tariffs can be imposed on the emissions embodied in imports from non-regulating regions. We present a theoretical analysis on the economic incentives for emission abatement of producers subjected to carbon tariffs. We quantify the impacts of different carbon tariff designs by an empirically based multi-sector, multi-region CGE model of the global economy. We find that firm-targeted tariffs can deliver much stronger leakage reduction and higher efficiency gains than tariff designs operated at the industry level. In particular, because the exporters are able to reduce their carbon tariffs by adjusting emissions, their competitiveness and the overall welfare of their economies will be less randomly and less adversely affected than in previously studied carbon tariff regimes. This beneficial distributional impact could facilitate a higher degree of legitimacy and legality of carbon tariffs. Keywords SammendragVi analyserer hvordan ulike utforminger av et system med karbontoll kan øke effektiviteten til klimapolitikken til en gruppe av land (koalisjon). I vårt eksempel ser vi på et kvotesystem for CO 2 i EU, mens resten av verden ikke fører noen aktiv klimapolitikk. Dersom EU kombinerer CO 2 -(kvote)prising med å legge toll på importerte varer som inneholder karbon, vil det føre til mindre karbonlekkasje og dermed ha en større klimaeffekt.I prinsippet skal tollsatsene utformes slik at karboninnholdet i hver enkelt importerte vare beskattes med samme sats som CO 2 -prisen i koalisjonen, og karboninnholdet som medregnes skal inkludere alle direkte og indirekte utslippseffekter produksjonen av importvaren har forårsaket utenfor koalisjonen. I praksis er det imidlertid mange administrative, politiske og legale hindringer i veien for å få på plass et slikt optimalt system for karbontoll.Vi ser derfor på ulike praktiske utforminger av et system for karbontoll. Først utleder vi analytiske resultater i en partiell modell for to regioner -koalisjonen og resten av verden. Deretter kvantifiserer vi, ved hjelp av en numerisk global likevektsmodell (SNoW), hvordan tollsystemene påvirker karbonlekkasje, velferd og fordeling mellom koalisjonen og landene utenfor.Vi finner at karbontoll som rettes direkte mot karbonutslippene til den enkelte bedrift utenfor koalisjonen reduserer karbonlekkasje...

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Section: Feasibility Aspects Of Targeted Carbon Tariffsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Targeted Carbon Tariffs - Carbon Leakage and Welfare Effects

et al. 2015

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“…Up to now, only three papers - Mattoo et al (2009), Böhringer et al (2012, and Elliott et al (2012) -consider both issues together: they compare different CBTA designs taking into account all inter-country inter-sector interdependencies.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…In particular, Mattoo et al (2009) Böhringer et al (2012) compute the efficiency impact of different CBTA designs, analyzing three different regulating coalitions: Europe, UNFCCC Annex-I regions except for Russia, and a broad coalition that includes China. They simulate a unilateral cap at 80% of the abating regions' emissions.…”

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Carbon-Motivated Border Tax Adjustment: A Proposal for the EU

et al. 2015

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Abstract:The analysis focuses on carbon-motivated border tax adjustment (CBTA). CBTA are tariffs applied to imports designed to avoid drawbacks of emission reduction policies when only one or few regions (the abating regions) implement them. Through CBTA the abating regions level out different treatment applied to domestic and imported products. In this paper we focus on CBTA metric. Through a multi-region and multi-sector analysis we compute and compare two possible CBTA systems that the European Union could implement to complement a hypothetical carbon tax applied to domestic products. In one system, tariffs are computed based on the emissions generated abroad to produce the goods imported by the European Union. In the second system, tariffs are based on the emissions that the European Union would have generated to produce domestically the same products. Results at country and sector level contribute to better understand the effects of this instrument and to add information to the political debate on it. Moreover, an important contribution of this analysis is that we explore methodological issues that arise from the use of multi-region and multi-sector models to compute different CBTA metrics.JEL Codes: C67, D57, H23, Q56.

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Unilateral Climate Policies: The Theoretical Economic Background

Lininger

2015

Consumption-Based Approaches in International Climate Policy

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Alternative designs for tariffs on embodied carbon: A global cost-effectiveness analysis

Cited by 68 publications

References 13 publications

Targeted Carbon Tariffs - Carbon Leakage and Welfare Effects

Targeted Carbon Tariffs - Carbon Leakage and Welfare Effects

Carbon-Motivated Border Tax Adjustment: A Proposal for the EU

Unilateral Climate Policies: The Theoretical Economic Background

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