My main argument in this article is that the human service professions ( law, social work, education, nursing, psychiatry, etc.) have a crucially important modernist legacy which is partly constitutive of their identity and mission and that when considering whether or not postmodernism is a threat to these professions or a harbinger of fresh opportunities, it is important to note that postmodernism is characterised by a tension between 'outright antimodernists' and 'ambivalent anti-modernists'. Focusing mainly on social work, I shall argue that 'outrightly anti-modernist postmodernism' is generally deleterious in its effects on the human service professions and that 'ambivalently anti-modernist postmodernism', whilst it promises to be more benign in its effects on these professions, actually fails in its present form to live up to its promise. I will also suggest that there is no good reason why the human service professions cannot embrace a form of postmodernism, provided that it is genuinely modern, i.e. that it does not disparage the value of the 'modernist' legacy of the professions and preserves it intact, whilst incorporating the insights of postmodernism into their various practice theories.(An asterisk after a term indicates that it is being used in a gender inclusive sense.)In this article, I wish to draw upon the general argument and philosophical outlook developed in Justice and the State [1] (and also, though to a lesser extent, The Origin and End of Modernity [2]) in order to analyse and critically evaluate the influence of postmodernism on the human service professions (law, social work, education, nursing, psychiatry, etc.). The present challenge to these professions posed by postmodernism obliges us to seriously consider its overall effect on them and the nature of its influence. Should we regard postmodernism as a threat to these professions or as a harbinger of fresh opportunities, as mainly enervating and undermining in its effects or as stimulating and creative? In trying to answer these questions, I am of course aware that postmodernism is an extremely broad and variegated intellectual movement, perhaps, indeed, so amorphous that it is simply impossible to arrive at any general judgements concerning the nature of its influence upon the professions. However, I shall argue that postmodernism is characterised by a tension between 'outright anti-modernists' and 'ambivalent anti-modernists' and that this tension enables us to make a broad distinction between two types of postmodernism which is particularly useful in helping us to answer the above questions. The first group (outrightly anti-modernist) holds that modernism has very few, if any, redeeming features and that it should be decisively rejected and consigned to the rubbish heap of history where it belongs; the second group (ambivalently anti-modernist) holds that the 'post' in 'postmodernism' implies an acceptance of, as well as a moving beyond, modernity. As Burbules and Rice [3]
In this article, I suggest that post-modernism is in essence a return, under radically different circumstances and with a cultural inheritance from the modernist era (especially thè modernist' principle of freedom of the individual), to a kind of (post-modernist) medievalism. The view that the`trend of our times' is towards a`post-modern medievalism' is based mainly upon a consideration of the decline of the nation-state, the replacement of`absolute' with a kind of moderated' national sovereignty and the fact that the nations and regional assemblies of Europe are beginning to look increasingly like the duchies and baronies of feudal Europe.(An asterisk after a term indicates that it is being used in a gender inclusive sense.)
This essay advances several interrelated arguments concerning the proper role of the state with regard to marriage and divorce but my main contention is that ‘pure’no‐fault divorce laws are unjust—or, at least, they are unjust if marriage involves a genuinely contractual element, and there seems to be very little doubt that it does. Locke, Kant and Hegel are three eminent thinkers who are alike in viewing marriage as a contract (though in the case of Hegel, it is a ‘contract to transcend the standpoint of contract’) and in the first two sections of the essay I consider their views on the role of contract in marriage. Whilst holding (with Hegel) that marriage is more than a contract, I also hold (with Kant) that it is not less than a contract. In section three I consider the implications of this ‘not less than’, the most important one being that ‘pure’no‐fault divorce laws are unjust. I shall contend that whilst the irretrievable breakdown of marriage may be regarded as a suitable ground for divorce, it simply cannot, and certainly ought not to, be regarded as a justificatory basis for the laying aside of rights acquired by individuals as a result of their having entered into a marital contract. However minimal one might wish the role of the state to be, or however averse one might be from allowing the state any role at all in purely personal and confidential relationships, yet to allow the expression ‘the irretrievable breakdown of marriage’to be employed as a olanket to cover over the infringement of personal, contractually engendered and civilly recognised rights, is not to exercise commendable restraint but is, rather, to condone what is simply an abnegation by the state of its basic responsibility to ensure that justice prevails.
The political covenant in Hobbes's Leviathan involves “more than consent, or concord; it is a real unity … made by covenant of every man with every man.” But is it possible for essentially separate individuals to merge their identity with the sovereign power and, if so, how? It is possible, initially, because each man shares a common desire for peace. However, this desire is “contrary to our natural passions” and is largely ineffectual until, through the device of a political covenant, it acquires the institutional support of the sovereign power. The will to peace is the essence of sovereignty; the establishment of a secure peace is its end. Ideally, the sovereign will operate within the parameters of legitimacy thus established. As a result of the political covenant, man's passions are contained, but the subject also acquires an enhanced ability to order his own actions in accordance with the will to peace.
2 By "suboffense," we mean a course of defined conduct with an offense grade different from that of other conduct defined in the same code section. In other words, a criminal code might have three suboffenses of robbery, or five suboffenses of theft, depending upon the number different grades of the offense that it recognizes. 3 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C (West 2010). Each suboffense was counted as a separate offense, meaning that any conduct that was graded differently from base offense was counted separately. 4 N.J. Stat. Ann. §2C:43-6 (West 2010) (sentence of imprisonment for crimes, ordinary terms). 5 N.J. Stat. Ann. §2C:43-8 (West 2010) (sentence of imprisonment for disorderly persons offenses). 6 See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. §2C:11-3b (West 2010) (sentence of imprisonment for murder, including imprisonment of 30 years to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole).
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