Could a Nazi soldier or terrorist be courageous? The Courage Problem asks us to answer this sort of question, and then to explain why people are reluctant to give this answer. The present paper sheds new light on the Courage Problem by examining a controversy sparked by Bill Maher, who claimed that the 9/11 terrorists' acts were 'not cowardly.' It is shown that Maher's controversy is fundamentally related to the Courage Problem. Then, a unified solution to both problems is provided. This solution entails that gutsy people who lack good ends are not courageous.Can one be courageous in pursuit of evil ends? James Rachels illustrates the question like this:Consider a Nazi soldier […] who fights valiantly-he faces great risk without flinching-but he does so in an evil cause. Is he courageous? (1999, 179).Many people are reluctant to answer 'Yes' to Rachels' question. But many are also reluctant to answer 'No'. The question thereby illustrates a two-part challenge, which shall be called the Courage Problem.The first task is to commit to a view on whether gutsy villains are courageous. 1 The second task is to explain away people's reluctance to respond as we have to the first task.One approach to the Courage Problem has potentially unwanted consequences. Suppose we accept that the Nazi is courageous. If we also hold that he has no moral virtues, then we're forced to accept a radical conclusion-that courage is not a moral virtue. Of course, this radical conclusion could be avoided if we insist that the Nazi has at least one moral virtue, namely courage. But this forces us to reject a classical position, that the virtues are unified-having one moral virtue requires having them all (Aristotle NE 1145a1-2). Even if the Nazi has courage, he surely lacks other moral virtues, such as justice. 2 Therefore, if 2 the Nazi is courageous, then either courage is not a moral virtue or the virtues are not unified. Voltaire infers the first conclusion from his view that gutsy villains can be courageous (1905, 223); James Wallace infers the second from the same view (1978, 77). However, if this paper is successful then these conclusions should not be based on the view that gutsy villains are courageous. This paper provides reason to think gutsy villains are not courageous, and it does so independently of whether courage is a virtue or whether the virtues are unified.The Courage Problem shall be examined in light of a controversy sparked by Bill Maher, who claimed that the 9/11 terrorist attacks were 'not cowardly.' Maher's comment generates another explanatory task-that of explaining why people were offended by it. This task shall be called Maher's Puzzle. In §2, we see that Maher's Puzzle is fundamentally related to the Courage Problem; it is thus assumed that if a given explanation can solve both Maher's Puzzle and the Courage Problem then this explanation is better than ones that cannot solve both (other things being equal). In §3 and §4, it's argued that the view that gutsy villains are courageous does not provide a feasible soluti...
The Gettier problem has stymied epistemologists. After Edmund Gettier (1963) proved the insufficiency of the tripartite analysis of knowledge, his paper was followed by a barrage of reformulated analyses, most of which were returned with potential counterexamples. 1 A succession of reformulations and counterexamples continued for over thirty years. However, within the past decade the general impetus to solve the Gettier problem has significantly receded (with only a few exceptions 2). But the abatement of this project is not due to any consensus over one particular analysis-quite the opposite. Despite the incredible effort invested in the project, no uncontroversial analysis has emerged. Indeed, some even believe the number of inadequate analyses indicates that no correct one is forthcoming (e.g. Williamson 2000, 30). Whether or not the Gettier problem is resolvable, we still must face an important question: Why does this problem arise in the first place? So far, philosophers have seen the Gettier problem as either a problem peculiar to the concept of knowledge, 3 or else an instance of a general problem about conceptual analysis. 4 But I would like to steer a middle course. I think the problem arises because knowledge is a particular kind of concept known as a thick evaluative concept, and a Gettierlike problem is just what we should expect from attempts at analyzing a concept of this sort. 5 These claims unfold as follows.
John Schellenberg has advanced the hiddenness argument against God's existence, based on the idea that an all-loving God would seek personal relationships. This article develops a reply to Schellenberg's argument by examining the notion of moral impurity, as understood by Paul the Apostle. Paul conceptualized moral impurity as a causal state that transfers from person to person, like a contagious disease. He also believed that moral impurity precludes divine–human relationship. The goal of this article is to develop these ideas into a problem for one of Schellenberg's key premises.
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