Courage, cowardice, and Maher’s misstep

Kyle, Brent G.

doi:10.1080/00455091.2016.1274630

Cited by 11 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…When negative‐strengthening implicatures are false, they can mislead us into thinking the target thick concept applies when in fact it doesn't. In Kyle (2017, §6), I argue this happens regarding courage .…”

Section: Expansion Viewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Expansion View of Thick Concepts

Kyle

2019

Nous

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This paper proposes a new Separabilist account of thick concepts, called the Expansion View (or EV). According to EV, thick concepts are expanded contents of thin terms. An expanded content is, roughly, the semantic content of a predicate along with modifiers. Although EV is a form of Separabilism, it is distinct from the only kind of Separabilism discussed in the literature, and it has many features that Inseparabilists want from an account of thick concepts. EV can also give non-cognitivists a novel escape from the Anti-Disentangling Argument. §I explains the approach of all previous Separabilists, and argues that there's no reason for Separabilists to take this approach. §II explains EV. §III fends off objections. And §IV explains how non-cognitivist proponents of EV can escape the Anti-Disentangling Argument. Ethicists often debate whether thick evaluative concepts, like kind, are composed of more fundamental concepts, like good. 1 Separabilists hold that thick concepts are combinations of more fundamental elements, such as thin concepts and non-evaluative concepts. Inseparabilists, by contrast, claim that thick concepts cannot be divided into evaluative and non-evaluative components. Separabilists must face an objection. If thin concepts are incapable of representing properties, as many non-cognitivists believe, it appears the thick concept's non-evaluative content must fully determine what property the thick concept represents. And this implies something problematic-that an outsider could know what the thick concept applies to without grasping its evaluative perspective. This is the Anti-Disentangling Argument, originating with John McDowell (1981) and advocated by many Inseparabilists. This paper proposes a new Separabilist model that's neutral between cognitivism and noncognitivism but can give non-cognitivists a novel escape from the Anti-Disentangling Argument. §I explains the basic approach of all previous Separabilists, and argues that there's no reason for Separabilists to take this approach. §II explains a different kind of Separabilist model, called the Expansion View (henceforth 1 Italicized expressions refer to concepts; expressions with single-quotes refer to terms. I assume concepts are the semantic contents of terms that express them, and that concepts and semantic contents are on the level of sense rather than reference. forthcoming in Nous 2 EV). EV holds that thick concepts (e.g. kind) are expanded contents of thin terms (e.g. 'good'). An expanded content is, roughly, the semantic content of a predicate along with modifiers (e.g. 'good to others'). After objections are addressed, §IV shows that EV gives non-cognitivists a new escape from the Anti-Disentangling Argument. There, it's proposed that a thin concept can play a role in determining what property is represented by its associated thick concept, even if that thin concept doesn't represent a property by itself. The precedent for this idea comes from semantically incomplete expressions, such as 'ready'. These expressions arguably fail t...

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Section: Expansion Viewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Expansion View of Thick Concepts

Kyle

2019

Nous

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“…For example, after the September 11th attacks, attempts to acknowledge the suicide attackers as "courageous" were strongly resisted. Their ultimate self-sacrifice could not be seen as virtue, given the evil of their aims (Kyle, 2017). A self-controlled villain is worse, not better, than a sloppy, pleasure-seeking one.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moral disciplining: The cognitive and evolutionary foundations of puritanical morality

Fitouchi

André²,

Baumard³

2022

Behav Brain Sci

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Why do many human societies morally condemn apparently victimless and pleasurable behaviors, such as lust, gluttony, drinking, drugs, gambling, or even music and dance? Why do they morally praise temperance, chastity, sobriety, decency, and piety? While this puritanical morality often appears as an exception to the cooperative function of moral cognition, we propose that it stems, like other moral concerns, from moral judgements targeting cooperative challenges. Specifically, we propose that it consists of preemptive moralizations of behaviors perceived as risk factors for uncooperative self-control failures, impeding people's ability to resist the short-term temptations naturally conflicting with cooperative motivations.

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“…For example, after the September 11th attacks, attempts to acknowledge the suicide attackers as “courageous” were strongly resisted. Their ultimate self-sacrifice could not be seen as virtue, given the evil of their aims (Kyle, 2017). A self-controlled villain is worse, not better, than a sloppy, pleasure-seeking one.…”

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confidence: 99%

On cooperative libertines and wicked puritans

Giner-Sorolla,

Myers

2023

Behav Brain Sci

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We agree with Fitouchi et al. that self-denial is sometimes moralized to signal capacity for cooperation, but propose that a person's cooperative character is more precisely judged by willingness to follow cultural, group, and interpersonal goals, for which many rules can serve as proxies, including rules about abstention. But asceticism is not a moral signal if its aims are destructive, while indulging impulses in a culturally approved way can also signal cooperation.

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Courage, cowardice, and Maher’s misstep

Cited by 11 publications

References 23 publications

The Expansion View of Thick Concepts

The Expansion View of Thick Concepts

Moral disciplining: The cognitive and evolutionary foundations of puritanical morality

On cooperative libertines and wicked puritans

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