In franchising, many of the elements of moral hazard models merge. Issues of two-sided moral hazard, bonding, and asset specificity all play a role. We extend the literature by considering how asset specificity creates an implicit bond and affects incentive pay. This approach implies that if one party posts a larger bond, this improves their incentives and allows enhancement of the other party 5 incentives through a larger residual income claim. Our empirical work supports this approach. For example, reductions in the specificity of the franchisee 's investment due to leasing lowers the royalty rate and raises the franchise fee. (JEL L14,533)

This article examines the effect third‐party certification has on a market characterized by adverse selection. Using an original data set from the market for young thoroughbreds, we show that certification alleviates problems of adverse selection by examining the effect certification has on breeder decisions to retain or sell horses and the effect these decisions have on observed prices. Data on the racetrack performance of the horses confirm the results.

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Wages, Lesbians, Heterosexuals, Education,

This paper provides insight into the wage gap between partnered lesbians and other groups of women. Using data from the 2000 Decennial Census, we find that wages of never-married lesbians are significantly higher than wages of previously married lesbians and other groups of women. Results indicate that controlling for previous marriage reduces the estimated lesbian wage premium by approximately 20 percent. Our research also reveals that wage patterns of previously married lesbians mirror those of cohabiting heterosexual women. Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that the lesbian wage premium is driven, in part, by differences in the labor-market commitment of lesbians and heterosexual women.

This paper examines how regulators behave in markets when there is a tension between retail competition and cross subsidy. Using retail and wholesale prices from regional Bell operating company territories and price-cost margins as a proxy for political influence, we find that private interests influence the structure of retail prices, especially favoring rural residential customers. Political influence also extends to wholesale access prices, although the magnitude of its effect is small. Federal high-cost universal service payments to a state do not reduce prices in that state's rural areas but instead lower urban business prices. (c) 2008 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved..

This policy study uses U.S. Census microdata to evaluate how subsidies for universal telephone service vary in their impact across low-income racial groups, gender, age, and home ownership. Our demand specification includes both the subsidized monthly price (Lifeline program) and the subsidized initial connection price (Linkup program) for local telephone service. Our quasimaximum likelihood estimation controls for location differences and instruments for price endogeneity. The microdata allow us to estimate the effects of demographics on both elasticities of telephone penetration and the level of telephone penetration. Based on our preferred estimates, the subsidy programs increased aggregate penetration by 6.1% for low-income households. Our results suggest that Linkup is more cost-effective than Lifeline and that auto-enroll policies are important, which calls into question a recent FCC (2012) decision to reduce Linkup subsidies in favor of Lifeline. Our study can inform the evaluation of similar universal service policies for Internet access.

No abstract