Many countries around the world are implementing Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) contacts to manage road infrastructure. In some of these contracts the public sector introduces economic incentives to the private operator to foster the accomplishment of social goals. One of the incentives that have been introduced in some PPP contracts is related to safety in such a way that the better the safety outcome the greater will be the economic reward to the contractor. The aim of this paper is at identify whether the incentives to improve road safety in highway PPPs are ultimately effective in improving safety ratios. To this end Poisson and negative binomial regression models have been applied using information from highway sections in Spain. The findings indicate that even though road safety is highly influenced by variables that are not much controllable by the contractor such as the Average Annual Daily Traffic and the percentage of heavy vehicles, the implementation of safety incentives in PPPs has a positive influence in the reduction of fatalities, injuries and accidents.
Resumen En este trabajo se presentan los principales resultados obtenidos de los modelos de accidentes con heridos y accidentes mortales ocurridos en carreteras interurbanas españolas, en el período 1990-2004, desarrollados en base a la metodología de modelos econométricos DRAG (Demand Demande Routière, Accidents et Gravité). Las 19 variables utilizadas para el ajuste de los modelos DRAG-España (I-DE 1), son de distinta naturaleza y corresponden a los factores de exposición, infraestructura, climatología, conductores, económicos, parque de vehículos, vigilancia, velocidad y medidas legislativas. En este trabajo se han incorporado nuevas variables, no tratadas con anterioridad en la familia de modelos DRAG, como las características tecnológicas (ABS) y de antigüedad del parque, así como variables de vigilancia y control de la seguridad del tráfico: el número de controles aleatorios de alcoholemia, el número de agentes de la agrupación de tráfico de la guardia civil, y el número de suspensiones y privaciones del permiso de conducir.Los resultados indican que las variables que más contribuyen al aumento del número de accidentes son: la exposición de los vehículos, la inexperiencia de los conductores, la velocidad y la antigüedad del parque. Por el contrario, el aumento de la vigilancia en las carreteras, la mejora de las características tecnológicas de los vehículos y la proporción de red de alta capacidad, han contribuido a reducir su número. Los efectos de cada una de estas variables se presentan en términos de elasticidades y los resultados se han contrastado y concuerdan con los reportados por otros autores.Abstract This paper presents the results of applying DRAG methodology to the identification of the main factors of influence on the number of accidents with injured and fatalities occurring on Spain's interurban network. Nineteen independent variables have been included in the model grouped together under categories: exposure, infrastructure, weather, drivers, economSecuritas Vialis (
Road transport is the most relevant source of Green House Gas (GHG) emissions in developed countries. To achieve global emission reductions in this sector it is necessary to take into account the life cycle of each technology. Therefore, policy makers need tools to compare policies and measures in terms of emissions in their life cycle.In this study, a methodology to account GHG emissions from life cycle for a vehicle fleet (e.g. from a country, a company, a city, etc.) was developed. Moreover, a software tool called GlobalTRANS was designed and built to compute emissions from the fleet. It improves a previous tool called EmiTRANS that estimated only exhaust emissions (Tank-to-Wheel) incorporating Well-toTank and vehicle manufacturing emissions.GlobalTRANS calculates and sums up emissions in terms of CO 2 equivalent. Default coefficients have been calculated for Spain but this tool allows users to change the coefficients and substitute them.Finally, the methodology has been successfully tested for the calculation of several fleets and pathways and results were compared with other Life Cycle Assessments (LCA). This paper presents an example from a diesel Euro 4 light duty vehicle showing that vehicle use means 79% of total emissions, while diesel production accounts for 13% and vehicle manufacture for 8%.
Análisis de los incentivos de seguridad vial en las concesiones de carreteras en España Rangel, T. -Vassallo, J.M. Arenas, B.Abstract: Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are mostly implemented for three reasons: to circumvent budgetary constraints, encourage efficiency and improvement of quality in the provision of public infrastructure. One of the ways of reaching the latter objective is by the introduction of performance-based standards tied to bonuses and penalties to reward or punish the performance of the contractor. These performance based standards often refer to different aspects such as technical, environmental and safety issues. This paper focuses on the implementation of safety based incentives in PPPs. The main aim of this paper is to analyze whether the incentives to improve road safety in PPPs are effective in improving safety ratios in Spain. To this end, negative binomial regression models have been applied using information from the Spanish high capacity network in 2006.The findings indicate that even though road safety is highly influenced by variables that are not much controllable by the contractor such as the Average Annual Daily Traffic and the percentage of heavy vehicles in the highway, the implementation of safety incentives in PPPs has a positive influence in the reduction of fatalities, injuries and accidents.Keywords: Public Private Partnerships, performance-based quality standards, road safety.Resumen: Las asociaciones público-privadas (APP) se ejecutan sobre todo por tres razones: para eludir las restricciones presupuestarias, fomentar la eficiencia y la mejora de la calidad en la provisión de infraestructura pública. Una de las maneras de alcanzar este úl-timo objetivo es mediante la introducción de normas basadas en el rendimiento vinculados a las bonificaciones y penalizaciones para premiar o castigar el desempeño del contratista. Estos estándares basados en el desempeño a menudo se refieren a diferentes aspectos como los problemas técnicos, ambientales y de seguridad.Este documento se centra en la aplicación de incentivos basados en la seguridad de las APP. El objetivo principal de este trabajo es analizar si los incentivos para mejorar la seguridad vial en las APP son eficaces en la mejora de relaciones de seguridad en España. Para ello, los modelos de regresión binomial negativa se han aplicado con la información de la red española de alta capacidad en 2006.Los resultados indican que a pesar de que la seguridad vial está muy influenciada por variables que no son controlables tanto por el contratista como por el Tráfico medio diario anual y el porcentaje de vehículos pesados en la autopista, la aplicación de incentivos de seguridad en las APP tiene una influencia positiva en la reducción de las muertes, lesiones y accidentes.Palabras clave: Asociaciones público-privadas, normas de calidad basadas en el rendimiento, seguridad vial.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.