No abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract: With the purpose of measuring and monitoring systemic risk, some topological properties of the interbank exposures and the payments system networks are studied. We propose non-topological measures which are useful to describe the individual behavior of banks in both networks. The evolution of such networks is also studied and some important conclusions from the systemic risks perspective are drawn. A unified measure of interconnectedness is also created. The main findings of this study are: the payments system network is strongly connected in contrast to the interbank exposures network; the type of exposures and payment size reveal different roles played by banks; behavior of banks in the exposures network changed considerably after Lehmans failure; interconnectedness of a bank, estimated by the unified measure, is not necessarily related with its assets size. Keywords: Systemic risk, financial networks, payment systems. JEL Classification: C01, C02, C44, C63, G21. Terms of use: Documents inResumen: Con el propósito de medir y monitorear el riesgo sistémico, se estudian algunas propiedades topológicas de las redes de exposiciones interbancarias y del sistema de pagos. Proponemos medidas no topológicas que sonútiles para describir el comportamiento individual de los bancos en ambas redes. La evolución de dichas redes también es estudiada y se extraen algunas conclusiones importantes desde la perspectiva del riesgo sistémico. También se crea una medida unificada de interconectividad. Los resultados principales de este estudio son: la red del sistema de pagos está fuertemente conectada en contraste con la red de exposiciones interbancarias; el tipo de exposiciones y el tamaño de los pagos revelan diferentes roles desempeñados por los bancos; el comportamiento de los bancos en la red de exposiciones cambió considerablemente después de la caída de Lehman; la interconectividad de un banco, estimada con la medida unificada, no necesariamente está relacionada con el tamaño de sus activos. Palabras Clave: Riesgo sistémico, redes financieras, sistemas de pagos.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract: With the purpose of measuring and monitoring systemic risk, some topological properties of the interbank exposures and the payments system networks are studied. We propose non-topological measures which are useful to describe the individual behavior of banks in both networks. The evolution of such networks is also studied and some important conclusions from the systemic risks perspective are drawn. A unified measure of interconnectedness is also created. The main findings of this study are: the payments system network is strongly connected in contrast to the interbank exposures network; the type of exposures and payment size reveal different roles played by banks; behavior of banks in the exposures network changed considerably after Lehmans failure; interconnectedness of a bank, estimated by the unified measure, is not necessarily related with its assets size. Keywords: Systemic risk, financial networks, payment systems. JEL Classification: C01, C02, C44, C63, G21. Terms of use: Documents inResumen: Con el propósito de medir y monitorear el riesgo sistémico, se estudian algunas propiedades topológicas de las redes de exposiciones interbancarias y del sistema de pagos. Proponemos medidas no topológicas que sonútiles para describir el comportamiento individual de los bancos en ambas redes. La evolución de dichas redes también es estudiada y se extraen algunas conclusiones importantes desde la perspectiva del riesgo sistémico. También se crea una medida unificada de interconectividad. Los resultados principales de este estudio son: la red del sistema de pagos está fuertemente conectada en contraste con la red de exposiciones interbancarias; el tipo de exposiciones y el tamaño de los pagos revelan diferentes roles desempeñados por los bancos; el comportamiento de los bancos en la red de exposiciones cambió considerablemente después de la caída de Lehman; la interconectividad de un banco, estimada con la medida unificada, no necesariamente está relacionada con el tamaño de sus activos. Palabras Clave: Riesgo sistémico, redes financieras, sistemas de pagos.

Summary. This paper introduces an artificial payment card market in which we model the interactions between consumers, merchants and competing card issuers with the aim of determining the optimal pricing structure for card issuers. We allow card issuers to charge consumers and merchants fixed fees, provide net benefits from card usage and engage in marketing activities. The demand by consumers and merchants is only affected by the size of the fixed fees and the optimal pricing structure consists of a sizeable fixed fee to consumers, no fixed fee to merchants, negative net benefits to consumers and merchants as well as a high marketing effort.

With the purpose of going further in the understanding of the payment flows among the participants in the large value payment system in Mexico, SPEI, we elaborate payment networks using historical data for a period of seven years. We conceptualize the SPEI large value payment system as a multiplex network and we study it accordingly. Based on transactions performed on a daily basis, we present three layers built on the following types of payments, i.e. transactions sent from participant to participant, from participant to third party and from third party to third party. We observe that those layers exhibit dissimilar topology: the participant to participant layer reveals the behaviour of banks settling their own obligations, which proved to be sensitive to the failure of Lehmann Brothers; the participant to third party payments layer presented stable properties; and the third party to third party layer resulted in an increasingly dense network since the system has been adopted for the settlement of low-value obligations between accountholders. In order to identify relevant players in those layers, we compare some well-known centrality measures and also a novel centrality measure specifically designed for payment systems, SinkRank. The rankings assigned by SinkRank show a low degree of coincidence across layers.

Summary. We develop an agent-based model of the competition between payment cards by focusing on the interactions between consumers and merchants determining the subscription and usage of cards. We find that after a short period of time the market will be dominated by a small number of cards, even though there do not exist significant differences between cards and the market is fully competitive. In contrast to the existing literature we focus on the dynamics of market shares and emergence of multi-homing rather than equilibrium outcomes.

The impact that the level of interchange fees has on the payment adoption rate in a non‐saturated market is investigated. This study is performed under different degrees of consumers' and merchants' awareness of the benefits arriving from the network externalities. In a four‐party scheme, we model explicitly the interactions between consumers and merchants at the point of sale. The interchange fees flow from the acquirers to issuers. We allow card issuers to charge consumers with fixed fees and provide net benefits from card usage, whereas acquirers could charge fixed and transactional fees to the merchants. Merchant's transactional fees are determined proportionally to the level of interchange fees. We establish that, under this scheme, the two‐sided nature of the market leads to higher adoption rates with lower interchange fees. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

No abstract