This paper characterizes welfare in a small open economy and derives the corresponding optimal monetary policy rule. It shows that the utility-based loss function for a small open economy is a quadratic expression in domestic inflation, output gap and real exchange rate. In contrast to previous works, this paper demonstrates that welfare in a small open economy, completely integrated with the rest of the world, is affected by exchange rate variability. Consequently, the optimal policy in a small open economy is not isomorphic to a closed economy and does not prescribe a pure floating exchange rate regime. Domestic inflation targeting is optimal only under a particular parameterization, where the unique relevant distortion in the economy is price stickiness. Under a general specification for preferences and in the presence of inefficient steady state output, exchange rate targeting arises as part of the optimal monetary plan.JEL Classification: F41, E52, E58, E61

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThe financial crisis has prompted macroeconomists to think of new policy instruments that could help ensure financial stability. Policymakers are interested in understanding how these should be set in conjunction with monetary policy. We contribute to this debate by analyzing how monetary and macroprudential policy should be conducted to reduce the costs of macroeconomic fluctuations. We do so in a model in which such costs are driven by nominal rigidities and credit constraints. We find that, if faced with cost-push shocks, policy authorities should cooperate and commit to a given course of action. In a world in which monetary and macroprudential tools are set independently and under discretion, our findings suggest that assigning conservative mandates (á la Rogoff [1985]) and having one of the authorities act as a leader can mitigate coordination problems. At the same time, choosing monetary and macroprudential tools that work in a similar fashion can increase such problems.

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We investigate the behavior of asset prices in a typical New Keynesian macro model. Using a second-order approximation, we examine bond and equity returns, the equity risk premium, and the behavior of the real and nominal term structure. As documented in the literature, our results suggest that introducing real rigidities to the model increases risk premia. Nevertheless we that find that, in a world dominated by productivity shocks, increasing nominal rigidities reduces risk premia. Such rigidities only enhance risk premia when economic dynamics are mainly driven by monetary policy shocks. The results imply that, unlike in endowment frameworks, matching asset pricing facts in macro models will require attention to the composition of shocks, not just the specification of investor preferences.