In this article, we offer an explanation for varying patterns of territorial reforms aimed at accom modating claims for more substate autonomy in multinational states.We argue that the interaction between preferences of state wide and non statewide parties, their negotiation power and the negotiation mode accounts for specific patterns of territorial change. Analytically, we advance existing research in two ways: First, by analyzing territorial change in a two dimensional space (vertical and horizontal), we pay explicit attention to jurisdictional heterogeneity between substates. Second, by applying an actor centered institutionalist approach, we highlight the stra tegic potential of actors within the institutional setting. The comparative analysis of thirteen processes of territorial change in four multinational Western democracies Canada, Belgium, Spain, and the UK reveals, first, certain conditional effects of the independent variables on specific patterns of territorial change and, second, how the negotiation mode impacts on a party's negotiation power.
Drawing on the distinction between self‐rule and shared rule in multilevel states, this article argues that shared rule has been the neglected element of the UK devolution settlement. The ability of the devolved administrations to participate in, and influence, national decision making through shared rule mechanisms is very limited. The article argues that the lack of shared rule is especially problematic in light of the increasing complexity of the Scottish devolution settlement in the wake of the Scotland Act 2012 and the Smith commission report. Smith, in particular, seems set to increase both the power of the Scottish Parliament and its dependence on UK policy decisions in the areas of tax, welfare and the economy. Creating a more robust intergovernmental system which could manage these new interdependencies will be a significant challenge, and yet, without such a system, the new settlement will be difficult to sustain.
Studies of constitutional reforms so far have equated formal ratification with a successful reform. The paper goes beyond this narrow focus by adding substantive success as a second dimension based on two indicators: degree of agenda fulfilment and degree to which the reform contributes to solve the constitutional problem. Analysing territorial reforms in unitary or federal states, we distinguish two types of problems group and efficiency problems. The comparative analysis of formal and substantive success demonstrates that first, reforms can be at least partly successful in terms of substance, although they may have failed formally; second, fulfilling the reform agenda seems to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for solving the constitutional problem at stake; third, cases with group problems score higher on both indicators, thus being more successful than cases with efficiency problems. Furthermore, the characteristics of the two most successful cases suggest that opportunities for participation, open dialogue and consensus building play an important role in explaining the results.
In the introductory article for this special issue, we argue that studying territorial politics through comparative-historical analysis (CHA) offers valuable insights for understanding the changing territorial distribution of authority in federal, regional, and decentralized countries. We point to limitations that have beset the analysis of territorial politics and suggest how recent advances in CHA offer a promising approach to avoid and overcome existing shortcomings. We also demonstrate and illustrate the ways that vertical and horizontal dimensions of territorial structures evolve over time, from the moment they are created to subsequent episodes of reform. Our aim is to show that time has causal relevance in connecting past and present patterns of change and continuity, and thus in capturing the formative and developmental pathways of changes in territorial authority.
In comparison with other countries, Belgium stands out as a 'laboratory' using non-territorial solutions for conflict accommodation before turning towards federalization by means of constitutional reforms in the second half of the 20 th century. Recent debates about splitting the country, however, question the success of these efforts. Applying historical-institutionalist approaches the paper identifies in a first step the causes of these centrifugal dynamics in different types of incremental changes prior to federalization whereas the constitutional reforms reinforced already established bipolar patterns. In a second step, it is demonstrated that constitutional evolution including the often neglected interactions between incremental changes and explicit reforms can be analysed with the conceptual clarifications of historical-institutionalist approaches.
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